1.1 Classical Utilitarianism
1.2 Neoclassical Welfare Theory
1.2.1 Manifest Preference and the Robbins Principle
1.2.2 Fundamental Theorems of Neoclassical Welfare Theory
1.2.3 The Unspecified Bergsonian Social Welfare Function1.3 The New Contractarian Approach
1.3.1 First Principles
1.3.2 Major Social and Economic Institutions1.4 Neoclassical Objections to Classical Utilitarianism
1.4.1 From Cardinal Utility to Choice Theoretic Framework
1.4.2 Sanctity of the Individual Unprotected1.5 Neoclassical Incompleteness
1.5.1 Compensation Tests: A Cavalier Critique
1.5.2 Impossibility Theorems
1.5.3 Minimizing the Significance of Incompleteness1.6 Contractarian Objections to Neoclassical Theory
1.7 Comparing the Three Approaches
1.8 Strengths of Traditional Welfare Theory
1.8.1 Sanctity of the Individual
1.8.2 Welfare as Individual Well-being
1.8.3 Distinguishing Evaluative Theories
1.8.4 Summary
2.1 The Labor Exchange
2.1.1 Karl Marx
2.1.2 Cornelius Castoriadis
2.1.3 Stephen Marglin
2.1.4 Harry Braverman
2.1.5 Herb Gintis
2.1.6 Samuel Bowles
2.1.7 Gil Skillman2.2 Economic Discrimination
2.3 Segmented Labor Markets
2.3.1 Peter Doeringer and Michael Piore
2.4 Influence of the Traditional Paradigm
3.1 Theory of Public Finance as of 1970
3.2 Previous Treatments
3.3 Influence of the Traditional Paradigm
4.1 Endogenous Preferences
4.2 Previous Treatments
4.2.1 John Stuart Mill
4.2.2 C. C. von Weizsacker and Robert Pollak
4.2.3 Herb Gintis4.3 Evaluation of Previous Treatments
4.4 Institutions and the Neoclassical "Blind Spot"
4.5 Institutional Economics Fails to Come to the Rescue
4.6 What Is at Stake
5.1 People and Society
5.2 The Human Center
5.2.1 Huxley versus Kropotkin
5.2.2 The Laws of Evolution Reconsidered
5.2.3 Human Nature
5.2.4 Natural, Species, and Derived Needs and Potentials5.3 The Institutional Boundary
5.4 Complementary Holism
5.4.1 Four Spheres of Social Life
5.4.2 Relations between Center and Boundary and Spheres5.5 A Qualitative Model of the Economic Sphere
5.5.1 Flow Variables Described
5.5.2 State Variables Described
5.5.3 Flow Variables Formalized
5.5.4 State Variables Formalized
5.5.5 Possibility Sets, Choice, Information, and Incentives
6.1 Formalizing Endogenous Preferences
6.1.1 Model 1: An Individual with Endogenous Preferences
6.2 Endogenous Preferences and Welfare Theorems
6.2.1 Round One: Endogenous Preferences Do Matter
6.2.2 Round Two: Endogenous Preferences Do Not Matter
6.2.3 Round Three: Endogenous Preferences Do Matter6.3 Evaluating Human Development
6.3.1 Development Patterns and Human Nature
6.3.2 Alternative Ways to Evaluate Human Development
6.3.3 Summary
7.1 Laying Old Debates to Rest
7.2 Misconceiving Public Enterprise Market Economies
7.2.1 Employee-Managed Market Economies
7.2.2 State-Managed Market Economies
7.2.3 An Overzealous Defense of Public Enterprise Market Economies7.3 New Criticisms of Markets: Snowballing Individualism
7.4 Markets as Cybernetic Disasters
7.5 Market Roles and Incentives
7.6 Market Inefficiency
7.7 The Prevalence of Externalities and Public Goods
7.7.1 Market Incentives to Create Negative External Effects
7.7.2 The Inadequacy of Traditional Solutions
7.7.3 Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms
8.1 Ownership and Income Distribution
8.1.1 The Flexibility Theorem Reconsidered
8.1.2 Income Distributions in Practice
8.1.3 Economic Systems and Implicit Maxims8.2 Weaknesses in Conflict Theory
8.2.1 Rebuttal to "Labor Power" versus "Labor"
8.2.2 Rebuttal to Asymmetrical Information
8.2.3 Rebuttal to Alienated Labor
8.2.4 Malfeasance Is Universal
8.2.5 Limitations of Single Period Models
8.2.6 The Importance of Human Characteristics8.3 Reformulating Conflict Theory
8.3.1 Human Characteristics and Conflict of Interest
8.3.2 Competition and Power
8.3.3 Gintis and Katzner's Invisible Hand Revisited
8.3.4 Malfeasance Reconsidered
8.3.5 Reducing Solidarity
8.3.6 Reducing Self-management Capabilities
8.3.7 Internal and External Labor Markets8.4 An Imperfection Theorem
8.5 Snowballing Nonoptimality
8.6 A Double Indictment
9.1 A Centrally Planned Public Enterprise Economy
9.1.1 Model 4: The Central Planning Problem
9.2 Round One: Efficiency of Central Planning
9.2.1 Calculating the Plan
9.2.2 Distribution of Final Goods
9.2.3 Job Assignment
9.2.4 Summary of the "Old Debate"
9.2.5 The "Old Debate" and Endogenous Preferences9.3 Round Two: The "Modern Debate"
9.3.1 Discovering the Technical Coefficients of Production
9.3.2 In Search of the Social Welfare Function
9.3.3 Material Incentives for Carrying Out the Plan
9.3.4 Summary of the "ModemDebate"9.4 Round Three: The "New Debate"
9.4.1 Central Planning as a Cybernetic Disaster
9.4.2 Central Planning and Authoritarian Roles
9.4.3 Central Planning's Inherent Bias against Self-management9.5 An Imperfection Theorem
9.5.1 Model 5: An Economy with a Bias against the Supply of Self-managed Work
9.6 Snowballing Nonoptimality
9.6.1 An Important Caveat
9.6.2 Summary: Snowballing Authoritarianism9.7 Central Planning and the Coordinator Class
10.1 Limits of Traditional Welfare Theory
10.2 A New Welfare Paradigm and Theory
10.3 New Results
10.3.1 Markets
10.3.2 Private Enterprise
10.3.3 Central Planning
10.3.4 Summary10.4 Toward a New Economic System
THEOREM 6.1 Misestimating Welfare Effects.
THEOREM 6.2 Misinterpreting Coincidence of Supplies and Desires.
THEOREM 6.3 Existence of General Equilibria.
THEOREM 6.4 Social Efficiency.
THEOREM 6.5 Distributional Flexibility.
THEOREM 6.6 Snowballing Nonoptimal Allocations.
THEOREM 6.7 Snowballing Warped Human Development.
THEOREM 6.8 Disguised Distortion.
THEOREM 7.1 Market Overcharges.
THEOREM 7.2 Snowballing Nonoptimality of Market Allocations.
THEOREM 8.1 Biases in Wages under Private Enterprise.
THEOREM 8.2 Snowballing Nonoptimality of Private Enterprise Production.
THEOREM 9.1 Central Planning Bias against Self-management.
THEOREM 9.2 Snowballing Authoritarianism in Central Planning.