The
interim government of Iraq was installed almost clandestinely on
June 28 in its boss’s office. Two days earlier than announced
and without the expected fanfare, the withdrawing U.S. governor,
Paul Bremer, issued his last decree and immediately left the country.
This officially terminated the occupation of Iraq and initiated
a “transition process,” which within 18 months is supposed
to result in the election of a government on the basis of a new
constitution. Although the occupation troops continue to exercise
military control over the country, the UN-Security Council accepted
this procedure with its Resolution 1546.
Its
success is questionable. Even after June 30, the U.S. will only
be able to maintain control over the country with the use of brutal
repression and military force against the growing resistance. The
transition is not headed toward sovereignty and democracy, but rather
toward a colonial dictatorship dependent on the U.S., to be terminated
only when the U.S. is forced from the country.
This
newly defined transition process does not correspond to the U.S.
government’s original plan. The decision to transfer direct
control over the country to an Iraqi interim government by the end
of June 2004 was made by the Bush administration in November 2003,
a significant alteration of its original plans. According to the
original plans, the U.S. intended to remain—after having disbanded
the institutions of the old regime—until conditions were ripe
enough to hand over power to an Iraqi government. After transforming
the Iraqi economy into a radically neo-liberal version of free market
economy, Iraq was supposed to become a federal, demilitarized state
with a weak central government—“protected” by the
perpetual pre- sence of U.S. troops.
The
consequences of this plan have been disastrous for Iraq and its
population. The living conditions in all areas of life are worse
than before the war and under UN sanctions. The assumption held
by U.S. strategists and their advisers from the ranks of the Iraqi
exile opposition—that the Iraqi population would tolerate political
and military occupation after the long years under the rule of Saddam
Hussein and the deprivations suffered through war and sanctions—has
proved to be an illusion. Other countries furnished little support
because of the occupation’s lack of legitimacy and Washington’s
unwillingness to grant them a say.
Without
relinquishing some of its control over Iraq, the U.S. would not
win additional allies and international support. In mid-November
2003 the U.S. government was forced to announce the transition of
power to an interim government and an end to the occupation by June
30, 2004. But the occupation troops were to remain in Iraq in the
future at the invitation of the Iraqi government. The date was so
chosen in order to deflect criticism at the beginning of the “hot
phase” of the presidential election campaign.
The Call For General Elections
Initially,
the “interim government” was to be appointed by a national
assembly, whose members were to be chosen by local commissions acting
under auspices of the occupying power. This was to create the illusion
of a sort of representation, but this plan had to be abandoned due
to decisive Iraqi resistance to it. Even the conservative circles
around the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al Sistani, who had, up to that point,
held themselves back and on whose acceptance the U.S. had been counting,
came out in opposition to the “appointocracy” with the
call for immediate free elections.
But
elections were the last thing the U.S. administration needed at
that time as it was evident that its opponents would win. Governor
Bremer insisted that elections should be done “in a way that
takes care of our concerns.”
The
U.S. government then claimed that technical problems would permit
elections in two years at the earliest. Iraqi officials and UN personnel
who are familiar with the conditions there immediately refuted this
argument. Even Carina Perelli, director of the UN election support
department, thought elections were feasible within six months. If
correctly prepared, elections of an interim government would have
been possible.
The
argument that the armed resistance prevented the necessary security
convinced no one either. This situation would not change as long
as the occupation troops remain in the country. But if elections
were held at the beginning of a transition process that actually
led to the retreat of foreign troops, security would be less of
a problem than at the present time, according to many Iraqis. All
Iraqi patriots, they reason, would support such a solution. This
was shown not only by a survey of high ranking Iraqi personalities
carried out by a UN-team led by Kofi Annan’s special envoy,
Lakthar Brahimi, that examined the possibilities of elections in
Iraq, but also confirmed, for example, by the results of the research
by Robert Colliers, foreign correspondent of the San Francisco
Chronicle. In December 2003, Collier interviewed dozens of Shiite
leaders, Sunnite clerics, and Baathists of all ranks. All of them
signaled their acceptance of free elections under the condition,
that the whole transition process be carried out under UN control
and the occupation troops be replaced by UN troops from neutral
states. But the candidates of all parties would have to be admitted,
including the Baath Party, after the purge of their compromised
former leaders.
Still
the UN team conceded to U.S. demands. Even though, according to
their estimates, elections could be possible by the end of the year,
not the two years that would be necessary according to the U.S.
Transitional Constitution
Another
important element of the U.S. strategy has met with broad disapproval:
the interim constitution signed on March 8 by the Governing Council.
The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) was drawn up by U.S. jurists.
In spite of its name, it is a comprehensively elaborated document,
destined to serve as a blueprint for a permanent constitution. The
reasoning is that even a constitutional assembly convened at a later
date could not overturn this constitution and a durable U.S. influence
would be subtly guaranteed.
The
Western media celebrated the new constitution as a democratic milestone.
Drafted in the small circle of the Governing Council, with the U.S.
in charge, it was anything but democratic. While granting ample
space to civil rights, the new constitution falls far behind existing
law concerning the social domain and—as was to be expected—it
abolishes all barriers preventing foreign capital from taking over
the country.
The
large majority of Iraqis were excluded from the discussion and many,
therefore, reject the constitution as a concoction forced on them
by the occupying power. They reject particularly the planned wide
ranging federal system because it aims at the break up of Iraqi
society and the weakening of the nation. Also controversial is the
reference to Islam as “a source” of jurisprudence and
the provision that no law can be in contradiction to Islamic law.
It is not at all clear what this will mean in terms of individual
rights, especially of women. The TAL is also indirectly granting
the two Kurdish parties, i.e., the closest allies of the U.S., the
right to veto the adoption of the final version of the constitution.
The
occupying power ran into trouble when, for its interim government
and projected constitution, exactly those Iraqi forces on whose
collaboration it was counting on, rejected its legitimacy. It was,
however, the armed resistance, which reached a new quality in March
and April, that really spelled disaster for their plans.
A
large-scale retaliatory strike against Falluja, a city of 300,000
inhabitants, proved a failure, in spite of massive ground and air
attacks, due to the fierce resistance put up by local guerilla forces
and urban militia. The number of civilian casualties—estimates
range from 800 to 1,200 dead—provoked an outcry the world over.
The besieged city became an international symbol both for the brutality
of the occupying power and the strength of the resistance.
After
the occupation force launched provocative strikes against the movement
of the Shiite religious leader Moktada al-Sadr, the situation also
became explosive in some districts of Baghdad, in Najaf, Karbala,
and other Shiite cities to the south. The battles between the occupation
forces and members of al-Sadr’s “Mahdi-Army” became
real uprisings with other Iraqis joining the resistance. The occupation
forces still have not been successful in retaking complete control
of all cities.
The
political damage was considerable: the uprisings in the formerly
calmer south completely contradicted the propaganda about a resistance
supported exclusively by remnants of the old regime or by foreign
Islamists entering from abroad. The support by large sectors of
society and the mutual support between Shiites and Sunnites became
too obvious.
Because
of the brutal attack by U.S. troops on Falluja, unrest grew even
within the ranks of Washington’s allies in Iraq. When the use
of torture was exposed, U.S. occupation policy lost all credibility.
The “coalition of the willing” began to crumble after
José María Aznar, Bush’s Spanish ally, was voted
out of office. Without the prospect of winning at least tactical
support from important sectors of the Iraqi population, the plan
from November 2003 lay in shambles and the possibility of shaking
off the label of being an “occupier” by the end of June,
dwindled.
The UN To The Rescue
Only
the UN was capable of rescuing the U.S. from this debacle. If acceptance
could not be won inside Iraq, the UN could help create a domestic
and foreign sort of legitimacy by signing off on the “transformation
project.” The UN general secretary and his special envoy, Lakthar
Brahimi, quickly answered the U.S. call for help.
Brahimi
suggested that the Governing Council be completely dissolved and
an interim government, consisting of independent and widely accepted
specialists be created and backed by the moral weight of the United
Nations. Initially Washington agreed and Brahimi took up the task
of forming such a government, only to have his suggestions rejected.
The team he was finally allowed to present at the beginning of June
was again made up of the same pro-U.S. forces as had been represented
in the Governing Council. This lack of independence of action angered
Brahimi. When asked earlier about the influence of the U.S. administration
on the selection of a government, Brahimi pointed out, “Bremer
is the dictator of Iraq. He has the money. He has the signature.”
Two weeks after introducing the interim government, Bremer quietly
left office.
The
highest posts in the interim government were given to people who
had already been members of the “Governing Council,” such
as “Prime Minister” Ivad Allawi and “President”
Sheik Ghazi Al Yawer, a businessperson living in Saudi Arabia. In
spite of his close ties to Washington, Al Yawer enjoys a good reputation
in Iraq because he is the nephew of the leader of one of the largest
tribes in the country and this is supposed to put the whole government
in a better light.
By
contrast, Allawi’s reputation is shady. He is suspected of
having worked in London as an informant of the Iraqi Intelligence
Service in the 1970s. Beginning in 1978 he worked for the British
Secret Service, MI6, and later also for the CIA. With their support
he formed, together with former military personal and high ranking
politicians from the Baath party, the “Iraqi National Accord”
(INA). Between 1992 and 1995 he organized terror attacks in Iraq,
causing numerous civilian casualties. He also furnished some of
the “evidence” used by several secret services to pep
up their reports concerning the threat posed by Iraq. His material
was the source of Tony Blair’s lie about Saddam’s ability
to deploy weapons of mass destruction in just 45 minutes, according
to the London Independent newspaper (5/29/04).
Most
members of the new government are also citizens of other countries.
Besides Allawi, there are at least seven others who are members
of organizations directly financed by the U.S. government.
It
was clear from the start that the interim government would have
little authority. It will neither have control over the country’s
finances destined for the reconstruction, nor will it take control
of the U.S.-led prisons and camps. In spite of all the reports on
the use of torture, the Iraqi judiciary will have no influence on
the imprisonment of Iraqi citizens and will have no possibilities
to prosecute crimes committed by soldiers of the occupation army
on Iraqi soil, not to mention demand reparations for damage caused.
Shortly before he left office, Bremer extended immunity to all members
of Western enterprises while on duty in Iraq. That means, for example,
that even private mercenaries cannot be prosecuted for murders they
commit in Iraq.
The
interim government is explicitly forbidden to change essential laws.
Opponents of the occupation also demanded this restriction. As it
has no democratic legitimacy, the interim government should not
be permitted to make any decisions that could be binding for a future
elected government. But this has been counteracted by the occupation
authority’s “Orders,” which have set the agenda for
years to come.
During
his term in office, Bremer issued over 100 Orders and complementary
memorandums that became law. One-fifth of these were enacted during
the last two months of his term. Most of them will remain in force
after the occupation authority has been dissolved. As long as Iraqi
institutions play by the rules, these Orders can be annulled in
due process only by an elected government.
Bremer
and his collaborators had reason to express their optimism to the
Guardian concerning the lasting effects of their work. The
U.S. jurists who drafted this constitution will remain in Iraq as
“advisers” of the interim government even after the dissolution
of the CPA in order to “keep their laws alive.” Over 200
U.S. “experts” are employed as “advisers” in
the 28 Iraqi ministries. Like colonial functionaries, they assure
that everything is taking the desired course. Bremer appointed “general
inspectors” as head supervisors for every ministry. He appointed
judges to the highest courts, installed an election commission that
decides which candidates and parties will be admitted, and a “media
and communication commission,” responsible for television licenses
and the regulation of the mobile phone network. This last body has
authority to decide sanctions against or the closing down of newspapers.
All of them have a term of five years.
As
the Wall Street Journal remarked, Bremer has “quietly”
built institutions “that will give the U.S. powerful levers
for influencing nearly every important decision the interim government
will make,” far beyond the so called “period of transition.”
Security Council Resolution 1546
In
spite of its limited power, Lakthar Brahimi and Kofi Annan did not
hesitate to describe such a government as “sovereign.”
Brahimi accused those who, for example, referred to the ongoing
U.S. military control of the country of being “too legalistic.”
For him “sovereignty” means “the formal end of occupation.”
“There will be a government that will be sovereign that will
exercise this sovereignty.” This is sovereignty by definition,
not on the basis of real power.
Explicit
UN aid is a similar expression of support for U.S. policy in Iraq
by other major powers. Even though Germany and France do not mind
seeing the U.S. and Great Britain encounter difficulties because
of their unilateral policy of aggression, they fear, for reasons
of self interest, a complete defeat because this would mean a major
setback for all Western states in a region vital for them economically.
Like
Russia, they demanded more authority for the interim government,
a timetable for the retreat of the troops, and more influence for
the UN and therefore themselves. The EU foreign policy spokesperson,
Javier Solana, even announced a “big confrontation” in
opposition to the proposed U.S. Iraq resolution, placing Iraqi security
forces under U.S. command.
It
was a tempest in a teacup. The Europeans did not exploit the distress
of the U.S. administration to win more concessions. With a few minor
changes in the U.S. and British-proposed draft, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1546, sanctioning the planned “transition
process.” The resolution “endorses the formation of a
sovereign Interim Government of Iraq,” and “welcomes that
the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority
will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty.”
The timetable for the transitions process was also agreed upon.
It previews elections to an “interim national assembly”
by January 31, 2005. This interim national assembly should, among
others, assign a new representative interim government and draft
a permanent constitution, on the basis of which a constitutional
government should be elected by January 2006.
After
the questionable Resolutions 1483 and 1511, this was the third massive
support that the members of the Security Council—in disregard
of the UN Charter—accorded states that, in violation of international
law, had invaded Iraq. They conceded to the aggressors the right
to dispose of their war loot and relieved them of their obligations
as occupying powers. Already in May the occupation forces had declared
the ministries for health, education, water supply, electricity,
public works, science, technology, and culture, “independent.”
In effect, this made them solely responsible for the misery in their
domain.
Not
quite yet in office, Prime Minister Allawi submitted a letter that
cleared the way for the Resolution. In it he zealously asked that
the troops remain in the country just as his master expected. The
U.S. foreign minister assured in a letter, from his side, that the
occupation troops would “coordinate” common military operations
with the interim government. This exchange of letters represents—according
to the Resolution—the basis for the founding of a “security
partnership.” This is a “partnership” between master
and slave: The U.S. Army will maintain complete control over the
“multinational troops”—as the occupation forces are
referred to in UN documents—and the Iraqi security forces will
be placed under the command of the U.S. Army.
The
mandate runs out as soon as a constitutionally elected government
takes office in Baghdad in the beginning of 2006. That shouldn’t
worry the Bush administration any more than the provision that “this
mandate will end earlier, if the Iraqi government asks for it.”
By the end of 2005, a treaty regulating the further presence of
troops will likely be signed and, because the interim government
couldn’t survive a single day without the protection of the
occupation troops, a demand for their retreat is to be excluded.
According
to Article 24, oil revenues had to flow into the “development
fund for Iraq,” which under Bremer became a huge slush fund
for the occupying power. The moneys of this fund are to be paid
in accordance with instructions handed down by the transitional
government. But on the Program Review Board with the final say over
use of the fund, the U.S. constitutes a majority.
The
export of oil, gas, and petroleum products will be carried out in
accordance “to the best practice of the world market.”
This means that Iraq is not allowed to comply with the price and
extraction regulations of OPEC. But if Iraq is forced out of OPEC,
OPEC—the only trust for natural resources of the former Third
World—would cease to function. The rules of the world market
would win out again.
No
doubt the adoption of the transition program was a diplomatic success
for the Bush administration. But it was no outright victory because
Washington was forced to accept a timetable that didn’t correspond
to its intentions. It can be expected that pro-U.S. forces would
have no chance in free elections and Washington will be forced to
put off or manipulate the elections. In both cases the political
situation will come to a head, but only after the U.S. presidential
elections—and that is the most important consideration for
Bush and his team.
The
most essential concession the U.S. had to make was to their opponents
in Iraq. The resolution neither mentions the transitional constitution
nor the federal system, as Ayatollah Al Sistani, for example, had
demanded. In a letter to Kofi Annan, Al Sistani warned the Security
Council and the U.S. against recognizing the draft as a constitution.
“Any attempt to bestow legitimacy on it through mentioning
it in the UN resolution would be considered an action contrary to
the will of the Iraqi people and a harbinger of grave consequences.”
The
Kurdish allies of the U.S. were extremely upset about this consideration
and threatened to boycott the new government. Washington is obviously
sitting between two chairs. It shows just how frail this whole project
is.
The Reality Of The Transition Process
The
majority of Iraqis have not seen how the installation of the interim
government has brought an essential change in the occupation of
their country. Intellectuals, like the former UN ambassador
Dr. Mohamed al Douri, rejected the concept of “limited sovereignty.”
Sovereignty means full control over the country, the airspace, the
natural resources, the economy, and the military. If this control
doesn’t exist, you do not have “limited sovereignty,”
but no sovereignty at all. “The same donkey, different saddle,”
explains Iraqi writer Haifa Zangana. “The Iraqis have lived
this lie before,” she continues. “The British transfer
of sovereignty in the 1920s was equally meaningless.”
From
the very beginning the new government made clear which direction
it was taking. Already before his appointment, Allawi announced
drastic measures against the opposition. His minister of defense
openly said that, “if necessary we will cut their throats.”
According
to the Sydney Morning Herald, Allawi had given a “good
example.” Independent witnesses reported that, in mid June,
Allawi personally shot and killed six suspects in a Baghdad police
station who were suspected of having participated in the rebellions.
He reportedly declared, “this is the only way” to deal
with the insurgents.
Ten
days after taking office his junta adopted a package of emergency
laws providing him and the occupation troops extensive authority.
With the consent of the president and his two deputies, Allawi can
declare martial law over any chosen “region of unrest.”
He can appoint military governors, ban meetings, impose curfews,
block or place under surveillance access to communication for certain
areas and detain suspects incommunicado for an unlimited period.
The occupation forces can therefore continue their activities with
formal authorization. Some would have us believe that Iraq is already
on the road of becoming a nation under the rule of law.
Given
the present conditions, fair elections in January 2005 seem unlikely.
If they are not put off because of the security situation, as Allawi
already hints, Washington will do everything to reach acceptable
results by a strict selection of parties and persons allowed to
participate in the elections. Bremer took the necessary precautions.
In one of his last Orders (Order 91), he excluded members of “illegal
militias” for three years from public office. This does not
apply to members of allied organizations, because their militias
will be integrated into U.S. lead security forces and therefore
“legalized.” This, of course, would not be applied for
opponents to the occupation.
According
to the “Political Parties and Entities Law” (Order 97),
parties can be forbidden if they “call for violence,”
“preach hatred,” or support “terrorism” or if
they are “suspected” of being financed by armed organizations.
The elections commission, installed by Bremer, will decide.
The
armed resistance has not only continued after the “transfer
of power,” it has become more radical. According to an opinion
poll by Oxford Research International the approval substantially
grew among the Iraqi population for armed action against the occupation
troops from 17 percent in February to 31 percent presently. According
to a poll taken by the CPA, the support for the radical cleric Muktadar
Al Sadr grew to 67 percent, just behind Ayatollah al Sistani with
70 percent. In this same CPA poll, Allawi only reached 23 percent.
The
138,000 U.S. soldiers, supported by 20,000 soldiers from other nations
and about 20,000 mercenaries, are the most important instrument
for maintaining U.S. domination over Iraq. With their permanent
base, they are “like having a gun constantly pointed at any
future Iraqi government’s forehead,” as Herbert Docena
from the group Focus on the Global South put it. Major efforts are
being undertaken by the U.S. to create loyal Iraqi support contingents.
They are supposed to stand on the frontline securing important centers
and, in the name of “Iraqization” of the occupation, impose
the authority of the occupying power.
But
it is the U.S. embassy, built into a fortress in the center of Baghdad,
that has ruled the country since July when it took over a large
portion of the tasks of the occupation authority. Ambassador John
Negroponte is the new governor, who, in Baghdad alone, has a staff
of 1,700 collaborators at his disposal. He is well experienced for
his new job. In the 1980s he was U.S. ambassador to Honduras. He
was not only co-ruler of his host country, he played a substantial
role in creating paramilitary gangs and the so- called “Contras”
to fight against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.
Since
autumn 2003 a reinforced effort is being made for the creation of
paramilitary units and a new secret police. In this year’s
budget, the CIA was allotted $3 billion for its clandestine dirty
war, a sum the president ratified immediately. Sovereignty and democracy
in Iraq are nowhere in sight. But a colonial dictatorship, a U.S.
puppet regime, is in the making.
In
spite of all this, most politicians and media in those countries
that had been critical of the war are now supporting U.S. occupation
policy. “Only the presence of the occupation troops can prevent
a civil war” is the argument widely used. But in fact, it is
U.S. policy that pits Iraqis against Iraqis. As Sami Ramadani, who
teaches Sociology at London University, wrote: “The seeds of
the Vietnam war were sown by the U.S. installing a client regime
in Saigon. And unless Bush and Blair are stopped by the American
and British peoples, a similar catastrophe is in the making in Iraq
and the wider Middle East.” It would not be a war of Arabs
against Kurds, Sunnites against Shiites, but a horrible war of a
U.S. supported minority against the overwhelming majority of the
Iraqi population. “The killing fields of this war could eventually
stretch from Afghanistan to Palestine.”
It
is very important that the antiwar movement rejects this propaganda
about the danger of an end to occupation. The revelations of the
U.S. using torture created an international scandal, shaking up
the acceptance of the occupation policy. Now we have to inform people
about the other crimes of the occupation forces. In June 2004, the
Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) published a comprehensive
report “Beyond torture—U.S. violations of occupation law.”
It lists breaches of obligations and war crimes, from the refusal
of essential services and the destruction of workplaces to the application
of collective punishment and torture. It is clear that these are
systematic and conscious crimes with terrible consequences for the
population. Whoever supports this policy, as did the German government
through its vote in Security Council, is an accomplice.
Joachim Guilliard
was a spokesperson of the German Campaign against the Embargo on Iraq
and is coordinating the German initiative for an international tribunal
on the 2003 war on Iraq. This article was first published in the magazine
Ausdruck. The article was translated
by George Pump- hrey and John Catalinotto.