In an historic round of multi- sector dialogue on peace, a delegation of
more than 300 people representing the Colombian government, guerrilla leaders
of the National Liberation Army (ELN), members of civil society, and international
observers from 36 countries, gathered in Costa Rica on October 16 to discuss
the 36-year-old armed conflict. Notably absent from the peace talks were
representatives of the different right-wing paramilitary groups, and the
leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who claimed
that the San José talks would have no bearing on the peace process.
Sponsored by Paz Colombia—a coalition of more than 100 non- governmental
groups working for human rights, the environment, and national peace—the
delegates used the international forum of the San José peace talks to address
the war’s affects on indigenous communities, human rights, the national
economy, displaced refugees, and the eradication of illicit drug crops.
However, the main concentration of discussion was on analyzing the controversial
$7.5 billion war-plan dubbed the Plan Colombia.
“The Plan Colombia was drafted in the U.S. Senate and implemented by [Colombian]
President Andres Pastrana, but the people of Colombia were never consulted
or included in this important decision,” said Episcopalian priest Monseñor
Jaime Prieto during the opening press conference. “[As a result], the
Plan is undemocratic…it does not represent a social investment in peace,
but a plan for escalating the war.”
Although advertised by both the Clinton and Pastrana administrations as
a plan designed to bring peace to Colombia, a closer look at the money
allocations for the $1.3 billion in U.S. financial contributions tells
a much different story.
“Eighty percent of the U.S. aid [in the Plan Colombia] is for purchasing
helicopters and weaponry,” said Marcos Romero, a spokesperson for Paz Colombia;
“only 20 percent of the money is going toward social programs.”
A further break-down of the 20 percent earmarked for social programs reveals
that 8 percent of the aid is going to alternative development; 6 percent
to human rights programs; four percent to assist the 2 million Colombians
who have been displaced by the war during the last 10 years; 2 percent
to judicial reform; and less than 1 percent to directly support the ongoing
peace process, according to a non-profit publication called the Colombia
Report.
In the language of the Plan, “the success of the [government’s] strategy
depends on its efforts to reform and modernize the military forces in order
to guarantee the application of the law and to return the sense of security
to all Colombians, in the totality of the national territory.”
However, by referring to the role of the army to establish “security” throughout
all of Colombia, the document clearly eludes to a military offensive to
regain control of the entire nation, some 40 percent of which is currently
under the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
“The main motivation behind the war is territory,” said Almando
Balwena,
the president of the National Organization of Indigenous Colombians (ONIC).
“For five centuries we indigenous have maintained our sovereignty and been
anti-imperialist. [But] now the Plan Colombia is escalating the war to
new levels.”
According to Bolwena, the military component of the Plan is equivalent
to a genocidal war that is intended to eliminate the 72 different indigenous
cultures from their land, clearing the way for the economic phase of the
Plan—Colombia’s integration into the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
“The [government] knows that it can not negotiate with the indigenous to
gain access to the natural resources on our lands,” said Bolwena. “So
it is waging a war that is intended to kill us or drive us off the territory.”
Through a massive and indiscriminate fumigation campaign to eradicate coca
crops—a majority of which grow on land that is inhabited by the indigenous
and under the control of the FARC—dangerous herbicides are poisoning the
food crops and water supplies of many rural poor people, according to local
testimonies.
“Indiscriminate fumigation is not only destroying the subsistence food
crops in some of our communities, but it is also poisoning the soil of
primary rain forests, killing animals and traditional plants that we use
for medicinal purposes,” according to a document provided by the Traditional
Authorities of the Awá People. “But the greatest injury is when our water
supplies are poisoned, resulting in the deaths of fish and affecting the
health of our people—especially the very young and old—who have experienced
bone aches, vomiting, noxiousness, and fevers.”
According to Manuel Alzate, Mayor of Puerto Asís, located in the southern
department of Putemayo, “Not much attention has been given to the ecological
dangers of the biological warfare that is being employed as part of the
Plan Colombia…. Originally the Plan called for the eradication of 50
percent of coca production over the course of 6 years; however, government
functionaries are now talking about achieving this goal in the next 10
months.”
As the adverse affects of the fumigation campaign become more widespread
and well known, many Colombians are questioning the motives behind the
strategy for eradication.
“The intention behind the U.S. strategy of fumigation is to force the indigenous
off of the land so that transnational companies can access the natural
resources, such as oil reserves and mineral deposits,” explained Victor
Matiz, leader of the left-wing political party Union Patriotica. “Many
campesinos have also proposed plans for gradual and manual crop substitution,
but these efforts are being rejected because of the concrete economic interests
that are fueling this war. The U.S. uses the rhetoric of human rights and
combating drugs, but this war is really about subversion and intervention.”
Although the non-governmental organizations that were in attendance at
the San José talks seemingly all opposed Plan Colombia, the talks ended
without any concrete agreement being reached between the government, civil
society, and the ELN.
The largest proposal to be shot down by the government was that of a 100-day
bilateral cease-fire starting on December 1, and a moratorium on the Plan
Colombia. The proposal was introduced by Jorge Rojas, spokesperson for
Paz Colombia, during the opening night of the peace talks, and was widely
supported by the non-governmental organizations in attendance—including
the ELN, the second largest guerrilla army in Colombia.
According to a written statement released by Ramiro Vargas of the ELN central
command, his soldiers (of whom there are an estimated 5,000) would agree
to a bilateral cease-fire with the government. Vargas even went so far
as to admit the ELN’s role in the conflict, stating “we share the worries
expressed regarding the human degradation of the armed conflict and we
assume responsibility for our share.”
However, despite the broad- based enthusiasm for a cease-fire and a moratorium
on the Plan Colombia, no agreements were reached with the government.
“Nothing will change, the war will continue,” stated a frustrated Mayor
Alzate after the conclusion of the peace talks. “There were no agreements
on the fundamental themes such as a cease-fire, human rights, and a moratorium
on the Plan Colombia.”
Yet, despite the failure to reach any landmark agreements during the peace
talks, important steps were taken to open new democratic spaces to allow
for an inclusive dialogue on peace in Colombia, analysts say.
Z
Tim Rogers is a journalist for Mesoamerica. This article first appeared
in the Tico Times, October 20.