CHAPTER TEN

THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE

• The Theory Of Contradictions
• Theory of Knowledge
• Classes and Masses
• Economics and Politics
• Strategy
• Chinese Practice
• The Maoist Theory of Contradictions
• The Maoist Theory of Knowledge
• General Theoretic Results
• General Strategic Results
• General Goal Results

Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall. It is like sweeping the floor; as a rule where the broom does not reach, the dust will not vanish of itself .... We must work hard at reworking our world view. 1

Mao Tse-tung

Comparisons between Classical Marxism Leninism and Maoism generally emphasize bulk differences: peasants versus proletariat; people's war versus class struggle; red bases versus organizing cells; sensitivity to bureaucracy and incentive issues versus espousal of even Taylorism; and so on. But such approaches often bog down by not distinguishing between contrasts due to change of contexts and contrasts due to really significant and general changes of political orientation.

Thus there are major differences between Classical Marxism Leninism and Maoism because of differences between Russia and China but also in some instances because of actual changes in the employed revolutionary paradigm. Our approach is to examine bulk analysis differences with an eye toward distilling the paradigm alterations partly underlying them. We want to show how Maoists and Classical Marxist Leninists not only focus on different aspects of their environments but also even perceive similar things differently, analyze them differently, and then seek to affect them differently, precisely because each sets out with a different guiding paradigm. We want then to consider whether changes from Classical Marxism Leninism to Maoism are helpful, and if so, whether there are any lessons for our own efforts to create paradigm improvements.

In this chapter we will summarily examine Maoist ideology and some of the history of the Chinese revolution. We determine three main things: 1- Maoism goes well beyond Classical Marxism Leninism, 2- Maoism bears out our specific understandings of Classical Marxism Leninism's weaknesses, and 3- Maoism leads us towards a number of new ideas highly applicable to our own situations, though by no means providing a whole new consciousness we can simply adopt in full.

The Chinese say that all their activities are guided by Classics Marxism Leninism coupled with the Thoughts of Chairman Mao. The say Maoist thought is really just strategic and tactical analysis carried of within the framework of China's own concrete problems. 2

We find this misleading and will show that Maoism alters rather then merely reinterprets Classical views. We feel the effort will help explain conflicts between Maoists and Classical Marxist Leninists and between China and Russia, and we also feel it will round out our understanding of past ideologies before we try to draw some lessons concerning what new ones should be like.

THE THEORY OF CONTRADICTIONS

The Maoist theory of contradictions broadens, refines, and extends the applicability of the Classic view. In this section we discuss how, ending with a summary of the change's positive practical effects.

The theory says all things change primarily because of their own inner natures. Thus, "the fundamental cause for the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing." 3 Nature follows its course due to its own internal tendency for contradictions. Taken as systems, factories change in accord with internal contradictions, and likewise for political parties. Similarly societies evolve because of the natures of their own internal contradictions. But factories, political parties, and societies, are not systems in isolation but in environmental contexts: though their changes are rooted internally, they are cause externally:

According to materialist dialectics, changes in nature are due chiefly to the development of internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes, and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes the society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new. Does materialist dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes are the conditions of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes. 4

In China in 1927, the defeat of the proletariat by the big bourgeoisie came about through the opportunism then to be found within the Chinese proletariat itself (inside the Chinese Communist Party). When we liquidated the opportunism, the Chinese revolution resumed its advance. Later the Chinese revolution again suffered severe setbacks at the hands of the enemy, because adventurism had arisen within our Party. When we liquidated this adventurism, our cause advanced once again. Thus it can be seen that to lead the revolution to victory, a political party must depend on the correctness of its own political line and the solidity of its own organization. 5

Again, as Mao put it, with no night there is no day, with no movement there is no stillness, with no war there is no peace, and with no chicken there is no egg. Each aspect of a contradiction owes its existence as a definable thing to the existence of the other aspect. Still at any moment one aspect or the other holds greater sway and then contributes to the definition of its encompassing system:

In any contradiction the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is basic. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position. 6

The transformation of one thing into another, through leaps of different forms in accordance with its essence and external conditions -- this is the process of new superseding the old. In each thing there is a contradiction between its new and its old aspects, and this gives rise to a series of struggles with many twists and turns. As a result of these struggles, the new aspect changes from being minor to being major and rises to predominance, while the old aspect changes from being major to being minor and gradually dies out. And the moment the new aspect gains dominance over the old, the old thing changes qualitatively into a new thing, it can thus be seen that the nature of a thing is mainly determined by the principal aspect of the contradiction, the aspect which has gained predominance. When the principal aspect which has gained predominance changes, the nature of a thing changes accordingly. 7

Large systems involve many contradictions and undergo many kinds of changes. Maoism says that in all such situations one contradiction is primary even though many may be at work. The primary one affects the others as they ebb and flow, more than vice versa. The primary one's principal aspect is the part of the inner nature of the whole system that predominantly determines the system's overall character and the characters of the changes it can go through.

In societies generally, the primary contradiction is between forces and relations, the old mode and the new mode, the oppressor and oppressed classes. In capitalism in particular, the contradiction is between the social character of production and the private character of ownership, socialism and capitalism, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In societies generally and capitalism particularly, other societal conflicts and on-going changes can be best understood in terms of these primary ones rather than vice versa.

For every well defined process there is a primary contradiction and as its two aspects struggle, they exert greater influence on the unfolding of the other contradictions in the process, than the others exert back on them.

When imperialism launches a war of aggression against such a (semi-colonial) country, all its various classes, except for some traitors, can temporarily unite in a war against imperialism. At such a time, the contradiction between imperialism and the country concerned becomes the principal contradiction, while the contradictions among the various classes within the country (including what was the principal contradiction, between the feudal system and the great masses of the people) are temporarily relegated to a secondary and subordinate position. 9

The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end. 10

The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena. Every form of society, every form of ideology has its own particular contradiction and particular essence. 11

There are many contradictions in the course of development of any major thing. For instance, in the course of development of China's bourgeois democratic revolution, where the contradictions are exceedingly complex, there exists the contradiction between all oppressed classes in Chinese society and imperialism, the contradiction between the great masses of people and feudalism, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the contradiction between the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeois on the one hand and the bourgeoisie on the other, the contradiction between various reactionary ruling groups, and so on. These contradictions cannot be treated in the same ways since each has its own particularity; moreover the two aspects of each contradiction cannot be treated in the same way since each aspect has its own characteristics. We who are engaged in the Chinese revolution should not only understand the particularity of these contradictions in their totality, that is, in their interconnections, but should also study the two aspects of each contradiction as the only means of understanding the totality. When we speak of understanding each aspect of a contradiction, we mean understanding what specific position each aspect occupies, what concrete forms it assumes in its interdependence and in its contradiction with its opposite, and what methods are employed in the struggle with its opposite, when the two are both interdependent and in contradiction, and also after the interdependence breaks down. 12

Where our dogmatists err on this question is that on the one hand they do not understand that we have to study the particularity of contradiction and know the particular essence of individual things before we can adequately know the universality of contradiction and the common essence of things, and that on the other hand, they do not understand that after knowing the common essence of things, we must go further and study the concrete essence of things that have not been thoroughly studied, or have only just emerged. 13

When, on the one hand, there is a contradiction between forces and relations of production and between classes whose interests lie with one or the other, the clash is antagonistic and resolution only furthers one side's interests. But, on the other hand, when there is a contradiction between two proposed work methods in a factory after a socialist revolution and between adherents of each, resolution favors all strugglers and the process is itself non-antagonistic.

In such cases, though contradictions resolution brings qualitative changes, the old system's characteristics are enhanced rather than undermined. This is the development in Maoism of the theory of non-antagonistic contradictions. 14

Contradiction and struggle are universal and absolute, but the methods of resolving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, differ according to the differences in the nature of the contradictions. Some contradictions are characterized by open antagonism, others are not. In accordance with the concrete development of things, some contradictions which were originally non-antagonistic develop into antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagon- references forebearers, in contrast there revolutionaries;

Systems go through processes of change in accordance with their internal contradictions. Any system's major characteristics are those of the principal aspect of the primary contradiction of the main process through which the system is going. When systems come into mutual contact (always and inevitably) they affect one another's processes of development, but in no case does an external cause create something that wasn't already potentially existent inside a system's contradictoriness.

Change actually occurs when aspects switch dominance relative to one another. The associated struggle is sometimes non-antagonistic and sometimes antagonistic. In understanding any given process one must fully understand universality and particularity. The Maoist dialectician in accord with the Maoist theory of contradiction continually analyzes systems in terms of the motion of opposites so as to find suitable methods for resolving given contradictions in desirable directions.

Thus Maoism first extends the method of contradiction to all and not just macro-historical systems, and second refines its categories (primary, principal, etc.), and third extends its applicability from changes which only undermine given systems to changes which further them, and form changes brought about only violently to those brought about partly or totally 'persuasively. '

We can expect that these alteration will help Maoists better analyze localized problems; analyze all problems more deeply, methodically, and generally; and also analyze non-antagonistic problems, finally; all of which improvements should contrast mightily with parallel Classical weaknesses.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The Maoist theory of knowledge, like the Classical Marxist one centers on reflection but nonetheless also goes somewhat beyond the Classical form. It addresses more carefully how consciousness goes from a blurry image to a fine reflection, and how it then even goes from a fine reflection of surface qualities to a fine reflection of 'essential' ones. In tune with these results it also discusses dogmatism's causes and effects, with an emphasis on methods of prevention. In this section we discuss these results concluding with a summary of their positive practical effects.

According to Mao, knowledge develops from perception to cognition to practice and back again:

In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, some people from outside come to Yenan on a tour of observation. In the first day or two, they see its topography, streets and houses; they meet many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings, hear talk of various kinds and read various documents, all these being the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yenan act on the sense organs of the members of the observation group, evoke sense perceptions and rise in their brains to make many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw logical conclusions.

As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality, and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference one is able to draw logical conclusions. The expression in San Kuo Yen Yi, "knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind," or in everyday language, "let me think it over," refers to a man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgements and inferences. 16

Knowledge derives from practice, is evaluated by it, guides it, and is in turn guided by it.

If you want knowledge you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. ... If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution you must take part in revolution. ... Hence a man's knowledge consists of only two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover what is indirect experience for me is (in the first place) direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is inseparable from direct experience. 17

...people engaged in changing reality are usually subject to numerous limitations; they are limited not only by existing scientific and technological conditions but also by the development of the objective process itself and the degree to which this process has become manifest (the aspects and the essence of the objective process have not yet been fully revealed). In such a situation, ideas, theories, plans or programs are usually altered partially and even wholly because of the discovery of unforeseen circumstances in the course of practice. That is to say, it does happen that the original ideas, theories, plans or programs fail to correspond to reality either in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect. 18

In a revolutionary period the situation changes very rapidly; If the knowledge of revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory. 19

Having good theory means specifically understanding things in their generality and essence, in their universality and particularity. It means understanding all contradictions and aspects and most particularly the primary contradiction and its principle aspect, again in universality and particularity. And finally it means understanding that such knowledge is based on practice, good only insofar as it reflects reality well, and deserving alteration insofar as it reflects reality poorly and as reality itself changes.

And given this theory of knowledge, Maoism clearly lays out the characteristics of various kinds of dogmatic thinking processes: some dogmatists understand problems only one-sidedly, not taking into account particularity, seeing only the similarities or only the differences between varying compared situations; some don't understand, or at least don't pay any attention to the need for a correspondence between theory and reality, thus not bothering to check and recheck their theories against practical results or always doubting the latter but never the former; and some overlook the fact that realities change over time so that good knowledge yesterday, today, and tomorrow are most often very different from one another, thus becoming tailist or adventurist. And Maoism's entreaties try very hard to offset tendencies in dogmatic directions, and, as we'll see in coming discussions of Maoist practice, very often succeed admirably.

Thus in summary there is a Maoist prescription for gaining knowledge designed to minimize likelihoods of superficiality, one-sidedness, over abstractness, dogmatisms, adventurism, tailism, and so on.

Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing. 20

CLASSES AND MASSES

Mao has admitted that he was very influenced by populists and anarchists and early in the Chinese experience there were definite divergences from the Russian tenets. In the 1927 Hunan report Mao not only extolled the peasantry and the countryside as the place of immediate motion and battle, but he also attributed to the masses a level of judgement normally reserved to the party. In a populist tradition he said that revolutionary parties and comrades would have to stand before the peasants to be tested and to be accepted or rejected as they decided. His ideas conflicted with those of the strict Marxist Leninists who praised the proletariat, and resolution came only when it became clear that of the two proposed only Mao's way worked.

Although Mao stressed class analysis, as he in some sense had to, to be considered Leninist and revolutionary, he also took a more populist approach as well. He said, "Merge with the Masses," "Learn from the Masses," "Become a Student of the Masses," etc. and he constantly referred to and talked about the whole Chinese People. He understood the importance of class and constantly did class analysis, but he also worked with other approaches and kept a flexible, non-fetishizing attitude.

In general his directives had at least partially the effect of overcoming the dichotomizing tendencies of Classical Marxism -- his constant references to the whole organic people is one example, but there are many others that are more obviously consciously aimed:

In this world things are complicated and decided by many factors. We should look at problems from different aspects and not just one. 21

We must learn to look at problems all-sidedly, seeing the reverse as well as the obverse sides of things. In given conditions a good thing can lead to bad results and a bad thing can lead to good results. 22

Further, early Maoism had roots in a culture which distrusted large political and economic apparatus; there was an emphasis on regionalism and so there was a kind of populist push towards the people. The earliest Maoist directives constantly reminded cadres that only by merging with the masses practicing first hand, could the cadres learn from them, and thereby efficiently serve and liberate them. There was nothing like this populism in Bolshevism and, given our previous analyses, its addition to Classical Marxism Leninism Chinese style, seems more a matter of a substantial change in body than just a minor refitting to a new country's needs.

Further, all these points concerning anti-dogmatism, populist faith in the masses, and concern about leadership and organization are borne out over and over countless Maoist passages discussing political, social, economic, and organizing questions:

Within the ranks of the people democracy is correlative with centralism and freedom with discipline. They are the two opposite aspects of a single entity, contradictory as well as united, and we should not one sidedly emphasize one to the denial of the other. Within the ranks of the people we cannot do without democracy, nor can we do without centralism. The unity of democracy and centralism, of freedom and discipline, constitutes our democratic centralism. Under this system the people enjoy extensive democracy and freedom but at the same time they have to keep within the bounds of socialist discipline. 23

There are two methods which we communists must employ in whatever work we do. One is to combine the general with the particular; the other is to combine leadership with the masses. 24

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

So, as opposed to Lenin's emphasis on the economic nature of things and the economic answers to all problems, Maoism emphasizes that "political work is the lifeblood of economic work" 25 and, where the traditionalists emphasize the cities, class analysis, and the working class, Maoists emphasize the country, recognize the importance of non-class groupings, and emphasize the peasantry. Much of the basis for these twists and reversals lie in the fact that Maoism has a broader dialectical method and a different view of people and of the importance of human interaction, than Classical Marxism does.

One of the crucial problems of any revolution is 'identifying the true sources of socialist consciousness. ' For the Classical Marxist Leninists and for Lenin in particular, the source was the trained cadre -- indeed the source was Lenin himself. Maoists find the situation more complex and don't bother hiding their ensuing 'confusion.' Like populists they are non-determinist and feel that actively organizing consciousness alteration is key to ushering in a new socialist era. But at the same time they also feel that peasants are the true repositories of socialist consciousness, and that they alone have the strength, goodness, and awareness, to actually construct socialism. Maoists believe people learn through experiences, and that those who have never oppressed and have always struggled are the ones in the best position to teach, even if they must also learn.

The fighters with the most practical experience are the wisest and most capable. The lowly are the most intelligent; the elite are most ignorant. 26

To link oneself with the masses one must act in accordance with the needs and the wishes of the masses. All the work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however well intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing and determined to make the change. In such cases we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves from the masses. Unless they are conscious and willing, any kind of work that requires their participation will turn out to be a mere formality and fail.... There are two principles here: One is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up their own minds rather than our making up their minds for them. 27

Maoists are historical materialists the same way that they're dialecticians; carefully, so as to take the good and avoid the bad. They believe that the people and the people alone make history, and that the spirit can be transformed into a material force. They don't accept the necessity of historical stages and they have a more balanced view of superstructure-base interaction than most Classical Marxist Leninists. They believe that the political often takes precedence over the economic, they believe the superstructure often dominates the base, and don't have any faith that once the base is altered the rest of society must follow. 28 Maoists hold these 'divergent' positions because their experience demands it, and because Mao's thought so alters Classical Marxism Leninism as to make the positions seem not so divergent as they really are. The Maoists are in fact heretics correcting dogma and not just traditionalists reinterpreting it, but at no time in their history was it possible for them to admit this, or in all likelihood even recognize it. The emphasis was necessarily on being a part of a heritage and not on being the creators of something largely new; once a heritage is adopted it becomes especially difficult to move towards renouncing it. It is somewhat easier to merely reinterpret old ideas to suit differing needs. And so in China we come full circle: As time goes along it is in fact Classical Marxism Leninism that is taken in the context of Maoism, rather than vice versa. 29

STRATEGY

Chinese strategy also diverges: the two things we wish most to discuss are the questions of organization and leadership, and the question of the links between revolutionary means and revolutionary ends.

Classical Leninists generally believe in Classical historical materialism. They regard the overthrow of the bourgeoisie as the end of capitalism and the beginning of socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Save the continued presence of counter-revolutionaries, they regard post revolutionary problems as largely economic, and so they stress the need for efficiency, centralism, and discipline in all endeavors.

Applying their broader dialectical methods, Maoists develop a more flexible, rich stand. They believe that classes are defined not only by their abstract relations to the means of production, but also by way of their actual concrete functions, and they also believe that non-class divisions are important. They do see as much significance in the mere change of who controls society as do the Classical Marxists Leninists. For them there are still workers, management, peasants, party and state cadres, men, women, intellectuals, soldiers, family relatives, children, etc. and they see that there are still contradictions among and between these groups (though dominance relations have frequently reversed), and that they must be resolved before there can be any kind of worthwhile socialism. And further as we'll see concretely in later discussions, and have already seen methodologically, the Maoists also recognize that different ways of addressing these contradictions have differing effects, even to the point where some can do far more harm than good. The Maoists are more attuned to the need for tactical analysis and better equipped to carry it out than were their Bolshevik forebears.

One of the tactical problems that plagues revolutionary movements and that relates importantly to the question of how to win revolutions and how to also set up better new societies, is, how one compromises between a volunteerist belief in the primacy of the cadre and a non-elitist understanding of the wisdom and centrality of the masses. How does one balance leadership and participation, centralism and individual initiative, discipline and democracy, how does one avoid au authoritarianism and at the same time get things done effectively?

Marx and Lenin saw little problem: The Party first, and the Central Committee before that, each answering to no one, though perhaps taking some lessons from the people.

The Maoist solution has never really been formalized; it is very flexible and rather populistic. Maoists are in a constant state of enervating tension -- they gravitate from being teachers to being students and back. They don't resolve the organization leadership controversy in one direction or the other, but instead try to merge the opposites, to both lead and follow, to trust the masses' spontaneity while teaching and employing discipline as well. The remnants of Classical Marxism Leninism are clearly present but the effort to move forward is also there. In 1933 Mao made clear the thesis "from the masses, to the masses": leadership gathers the ideas of the masses, clarifies and distills them, and then propagates them back so the ideas can be used and refined over and over. Maoists constantly worry about the dynamics of leadership and organizations even if they do accept the Marxist Leninist forms as a starting point. As a result they often move beyond the starting point to realizations well beyond those of any Bolsheviks:

Apart from the role played by the party, the reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on in spite of such poor material conditions and such frequent engagements is its practice of democracy. The officers do not beat the men; the officers and men receive equal treatment; soldiers are free to hold meetings and speak out; trivial formalities have been done away with; and the accounts are open for all to inspect.... In China the Army needs democracy as much as the people do. Democracy in our army is an important weapon for undermining the feudal mercenary army. 30

Two principles must be observed: 1- Say all you know and say it without reserve; 2- Don't blame the speaker but take his words as a warning. Unless the principle of "don't blame the speaker" is observed genuinely and not falsely, the result will not be "say all you know and say it without reserve." 31

The Maoist movement came in a backward illiterate country where the need for leadership was obvious. The Maoists recognized this, but also recognized the need for freedom and dignity. They had faith that the right mix of leadership and spontaneity would bring out the wisdom of the masses and thereby lead to good results. Mao makes the point explicit:

Twenty years of experience tell us that the right task, policy, and style of work invariably conform with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably strengthen our ties with the masses, and the wrong task, policy, and style of work invariably disagree with the demands of the masses at a given time and place and invariably alienate us from the masses. The reason why such evils as dogmatism, tailism, bureaucracy, and an arrogant attitude in work are definitely harmful and intolerable, and why anyone suffering from these maladies must overcome them, is that they alienate us from the masses. 32

Everyone engaged in practical work must investigate conditions at the lower levels. Such investigation is especially necessary for those who know theory but do not know actual conditions, for otherwise they will not be able to link theory with practice. Although my assertion "no investigation, no right to speak," has been ridiculed as narrow empiricism, to this day I do not regret having made it; far from regretting it, I still insist that without investigation there cannot possibly be any right to speak. There are many people who "the moment they alight from the official carriage," make a hullabaloo, spout opinions, criticize this and condemn that; but, in fact, ten out of ten of them will meet with failure. For such views or criticisms which are not based on thorough investigation, are nothing but ignorant twaddle. Countless times our Party suffered at the hands of these "imperial envoys," who rushed here, there, and everywhere. 33

Another quote will help to show the depth of insight that goes into the many admonitions against the ills of sectarianism, arrogance, elitism, and other related 'maladies':

Many things may become baggage, may become encumbrances if we cling to them blindly and uncritically. Let us take some illustrations. Having made mistakes, you may feel that come what may, you are saddled with them, and so become dispirited; if you have not made mistakes you may feel that you are free from error and so become conceited. Lack of achievement may even breed pride and arrogance. A comrade with a short record of struggle may shirk responsibility on this account, while a veteran may become opinionated because of his long record of struggle. Worker and peasant comrades, because of pride in their class origin may look down upon intellectuals, while intellectuals because they have a certain amount of knowledge, may look down upon worker and peasant comrades. Any specialized skill may be capitalized on and so may lead to arrogance or contempt of others. Even one's age may become grounds for conceit. The young, because they are bright and capable, may look down upon the old; and the old, because they are rich in experience, may look down upon the young. All such things become encumbrances or baggage if there is no critical awareness. 34

Means and ends problems are critical to all complex tasks. Will a certain approach to solving an immediate difficulty pay off over the long run as well, or will long run deficits overcome short run gains? Will employing force today to defeat an enemy now so compromise us that it binders future potentials or will it have a long run value too? Lenin understood such questions were critically important. One of his greatest contributions was an analysis of imperialism and nationalism in light of their overall effects upon long and short run strategic options. But as we have already shown, he had only nominal ability to deal with more intricate problems of this type -- in fact he was usually unaware of their existence. He knew the means-end question was important, but he was poorly equipped to do much about it. He believed in Classical historical materialism. He gave little credence to psychology. He felt that one simply had to overcome each hurdle as it arose and that the end would be reached in due time. The movement was incorruptible and unstoppable; means-ends problems existed, but they weren't likely to be too important or to have too much overall effect. Given an end a means must be chosen. The fact that the means might counter the end or have other adverse effects for psycho-social rather than politico-economic reasons was hardly ever considered.

Mao is different. He follows more in the populist and anarchist traditions; in a sense he is simply more comprehensive. He has a deeper awareness of human interaction, a different methodology, and a skepticism about inevitability, all contributing to his extreme concern with means-ends problems. So, for example, his thoughts about leadership are different than Lenin's. "From the masses, to the masses," represents an attempt to insure that leadership problems are handled so as to lead toward a socialist future rather than so as to put up insurmountable impediments to such a future. Another directive gives a very explicit warning concerning means-ends problems and all tactical questions. It tries to teach people how to think about strategy and how to form programs that might succeed:

They (the communists) must grasp the principle of subordinating the needs of the part to the needs of the whole. If a proposal appears feasible for a partial situation but not for the situation as a whole, then the part must give way to the whole. Conversely, if the proposal is not feasible for the part but is feasible in the light of the situation as a whole, again the part must give way to the whole. This is what is meant by considering the situation as a whole. 35

Maoist criticism/self-criticism is designed to help cadres overcome their weaknesses and especially the ill-effects of power, and at the same time help everyone scrutinize policies so that they might always improve. Tactically, due to his theory of antagonism, non-antagonism, Mao discusses contradictions among the people and contradictions between the people and the enemy in two different ways. He understands the absolute need for unity among the vast majority; he understands the negative effects the use of force, coercion, and indoctrination can have on people's feelings and spirits.

Our comrades must understand that ideological remoulding involves long term, patient, and painstaking work, and they must not attempt to change people's ideologies which have been shaped over decades of life, by giving a few lectures or by holding a few meetings. Persuasion not compulsion is the only way to convince them. To try to convince them by force simply won't work. This kind of method is impermissible in dealing with comrades or friends. 36

All our cadres, whatever their rank, are servants of the people, and whatever we do is to serve the people. How then can we be reluctant to discard any of our bad traits. 37

The effects of Maoism's 'humanism' and its long term biases come through most clearly in policies aimed at people with wrong or bad ideas. The traditional way for dealing with such questions is of course well known, (whether practiced moderately by liberal capitalists or by Leninists, or whether practiced extremely by fascists or Stalinists), but Mao's way is not, perhaps because it is so different. He besieges people over and over:

With regard to people who have made mistakes, stress must be laid on doing careful and patient ideological work and truly acting on the principle, "of learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones," and "curing the sickness to save the patient," in order to achieve the twofold objective of clarity in ideology and unity among comrades. 38

CHINESE PRACTICE

In the early years of the Chinese Communist Party there were two factions. The first favored a traditional view of the ascendancy of the proletariat and the second emphasized the countryside and the peasantry The majority thought the peasant based approach sacrilegious, the Comintern was the international communist boss and Mao was a kind of sacrilegious maverick.

As time went on, despite what the gospel said, the units in the cities atrophied while those in the countryside grew strong. Mao organized a fledgling Red Army, his ideas gained some small legitimacy, and his stature in the movement grew.

Still the Party bureaucracy couldn't bring itself to give in. They issued a call for Mao to take his germinal groups together and start attacking larger cities. Mao thought such an approach backward:

He felt that the most fertile ground for political work and therefore for military work as well, was far from the cities, where there was little or no civil authority. 39

In 1930 Mao and his comrade Chu Teh defied Party orders to lay siege to a large city and instead ordered a general retreat to attack again later elsewhere. Their troops followed unhesitatingly, thus making it perfectly clear that their allegiance was to Mao and not to the city Party. The Central Committee was left with no real choice: it censured its own leaders and gave Mao full support. Mao had the only significant support among the people and a split with him would have been fatal to the Party's future.

From then on the Red Army's primary task was gaining footholds in the countryside. Political cadres within and without the army were to radicalize the masses until they fully supported the cause. Mao's whole theory of a people's war depended upon the success of the political effort.

The main method of political education was land reform and the redistribution of wealth and power at the local level, but a subsidiary method was the very nature and style of work of the army and its cadres -- they taught and gathered respect due to example, but they also sought to learn and give respect as well. The land reform and all other activities were carefully carried out in ways designed not to create insurmountable private peasant interests, and in ways well suited to the development of political awareness.

A detailed study of Mao's wartime strategy is beyond us here but some of its results might well be mentioned. They show Mao's great ability to think within the context of a total awareness of the whole rather than in only the immediate part. It shows Maoism's patience and maturity in the field, and it shows again how Maoist directives seek to unite traditionally contrary ways of acting into powerful workable combinations. The whole Maoist military program is marked by an ability to synthesize, the patience to apply long term rather than extremist tactics, and the dominance of a 'humanist' perspective. A quotation lends credence to these assertions until such time as the reader can personally check them out:

The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution. Especially at present (1929) the Red Army should certainly not confine itself to fighting; besides fighting to destroy the enemy's military strength, it should shoulder such important tasks as doing propaganda among the masses, arming them, helping them to establish revolutionary political power, and setting up Party organizations. The Red Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct propaganda among the masses, organize them, arm them, and help them to establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives fighting loses its meaning, and the Red Army loses its reason for existence. 40

The Chinese war with Japan was essentially nationalist, and Mao's and Chiang's forces both fought the Japanese. But the communists distinguished themselves and won many recruits away from their temporary allies -- guerilla tactics were highly successful and the Red Army was most courageous and the people were aware of it. The communist reputation for fairness and land redistribution survived wherever the troops went. Their understanding of the importance of how people felt about the left paid off over and over.

The Long March was followed by a long stay in the northwestern base area known as Yenan. There many early Maoist tendencies developed great strength and richness: there was a massive study practice school for revolutionaries; farming and small industry were successfully adopted, and the political policies of democracy, participation, and criticism/self-criticism were extended. Yenan thrived -- it was a red base, a model for the Chinese people to see and thereby to understand the potential of a communist state. The Maoists were the first leaders in Chinese history who clearly shared in the fate of the masses while working at their side with mutual respect. As each year passed, support grew; new recruits went constantly to Yenan or organized party units where they lived.

At the end of the Japanese struggle Chiang thought he was China's sole rightful ruler. He refused Mao's offer to form a coalition government and ordered him to disarm the Red Army. The truce formed for fighting the Japanese was quickly annulled and new fighting broke out. Despite massive American aid, Chiang's armies were helpless in the face of Maoist know how and determination. The Red Army used guerilla, unconventional, and conventional tactics; discipline and democracy; had a reputation for honesty, virtue, and land reform; experience and solidarity; and the support of the great masses of the Chinese peasantry. The struggle lasted three years. Chiang wound up on Formosa, Mao was in Peking, and Maoism was in the countryside.

But this was far from the end of the struggle:

After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will be enemies without guns; they are bound to still struggle desperately against us, and we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not now raise and understand the problem in this way we shall commit the gravest mistakes. 41

The immediate strategic objective had to be the rehabilitation of the national economy; in a way that would lay the groundwork for the future socialist transformation of the economy and the society. 42

...in 1949 China was hardly more developed than Russia in 1917...yet this does not seem to have "forced" him (Mao) to resort continually to violence. The basis of his system is an extensive indoctrination, but the ideological coercion one sees being exercised in moments of sharp political conflict never develop into bloody persecution. 43

By 1953 the Maoists felt secure enough to embark upon their first five year plan. They were already building a strong Classical state, there was much discipline and a huge emphasis on Classical order and effectiveness. But there was also the Maoist divergence from these tendencies in addition to the specific qualities of the Chinese situation itself. So there were the beginnings of a Leninist problem, the early growth of Maoist alternatives, and the everpresent influence of the whole of China's own specific heritages.

The slogan adopted was "Learn from the Soviet Union," and the goal was to build an industrial framework for the support of all future development. The method was to be one of central planning based on the Russian model, but despite the desire, the Maoists couldn't really transplant the 'soviet' approaches. Chinese conditions were different. A long history of local autonomy pushed successfully towards decentralization. Consumer goods development and distribution, and light industry development were all handled at the provincial level. The Chinese met and surpassed their economic targets but additionally and perhaps more importantly, their new forms of administration fostered extensive health and education campaigns which were very successful.

Further, in this first period the agricultural plan aimed at the introduction of collectivism gradually, in ways conducive to future consolidation and progress. Cadres joined the peasants in the fields. Through dialogue and example they established mutual aid teams to deal with immediate difficulties requiring group labor. They increased membership by convincing through example, instead of using force or economic coercion. And by the end of 1957 a remarkable 88% of China's families had fallen sway to the mixture of moral and material incentive and joined the cooperatives.

Then in 1958 there began the great leap forward which we can now recognize as the precursor to the great proletarian cultural revolution. The new motion followed Mao's trip to Russia and it seems reasonable that it was the visit that finally convinced him more stringent measures were needed if politics was to really command, and if moral incentives were to dominate material ones. The Russian approaches had to be consciously augmented and even overcome. In 1957 Mao clarified the new position:

In China, although the main socialist transformation has been completed with respect to the system of ownership, and although the large scale and turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of the previous revolutionary periods have in the main come to an end, there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remolding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started. The class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect the question of which will win out, Socialism or Capitalism, is still not really settled. 44

...the Chinese people are carrying out a vigorous rectification movement in order to bring about the rapid development of Socialism in China on a firmer basis. It is a movement for carrying out a nationwide debate which is both guided and free, a debate in the city and the countryside on such questions as the socialist road versus the capitalist road, the basic system of the state and its major policies, the working system of party and government functionaries, and the question of the welfare of the people, a debate which is conducted by setting forth facts and reasoning things out, so as correctly to resolve those actual contradictions among the people which demand immediate solutions. This is a socialist movement for the self-education and self-remolding of the people. 45

But the Great Leap Forward, because of its great daring, was also quite untraditional and it caused significant concern in the Western communist countries. The Russians withdrew technicians and aid and at the same time China had a number of major natural disasters. The years 1959-61 were thus extremely severe. Agriculture fell off considerably and industry lagged many years behind what could have been justifiably expected.

As the economic crisis of China deepened with the crop failures of '59-'61, the New Economic Policy emerged. It aimed to strengthen the authority of management and of the ministries, while giving more scope for the generation of free market forces in agriculture and industry, at the expense of the authority of decentralized political cadres. 46

During the period there was a great debate about incentives: the 'real' Maoists insisted that the period was only a temporary crisis reaction while the other 'fake' Maoists argued for its permanence and worth. The 'others' had a concrete advantage in the debate -- with each passing day more and more technocrats and experts got positions of political and economic power and ever-widening differences in income and privilege ensued. More and more people gained interests in continuing the NEP. On one side the debate continued, the interest building process continued, and various 'Leninist groups' began consolidating their programs and powers. On the other side Mao began making plans for a new rectification program to restore the ideas of the Great Leap Forward.

Mao never swerved from his desire to have politics in command. He wanted planning to dominate the economy; he wanted humanist values to be the driving forces behind planning; and he wanted moral incentives to be the primary mechanisms for motivating and implementing planning goals. He began assembling loyal' forces in '60-'64. He tested the strength of his views in cultural and incentive debate. In 1964 he began decrying revisionism in the Party, and he reorganized the People's Liberation Army according to his policies, with people loyal to his views in leadership.

Whereas Lenin's Classical Marxist goal had been industrialism by any means, and whereas other Chinese groups had adopted that conception and were attempting to carry it out, Mao was still committed to an all-sided development by means conducive to political growth and individual remolding. The Russians went 'stage by stage' using modified Taylor methods and whatever else suited and 'coincidentally' enhanced the power and wealth and centrality of the leaders; some of the Maoists went that way too and all were certainly partly infected with the involved tendencies. Nonetheless, Maoism asked how a stage could be skipped and carefully considered what to do economically and what to do politically. Mao and Lin Piao began the dynamics of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the context of the restoration years '61-'64.

The Cultural Revolution was one of the most misunderstood but immensely effective events of modern times. The Chinese people were aroused and carried on a deep political struggle involving criticism of people at every level of the Chinese Communist apparatus. Outsiders projected, and thought it meant Civil War. The movement was virtually unprecedented in international political history: never had so many people been so involved in so huge an undertaking without major warfare ensuing. A political parallel in the United States would perhaps barely exist if all of a sudden a presidential administration gave free wheel to Blacks, welfare recipients, and youths, to correct what they felt were the weaknesses of local and then national conditions by direct, sustained, and largely unsupervised activity. In the United States such a sudden cultural revolution would likely lead to an immense bloodbath and the temporary dissolution of all past order with unpredictable final results.

The Cultural Revolution began actively in the universities. Students started questioning the bourgeois nature of their educations and of their schools' admissions policies. They did it by means of open political debate, mass gatherings, and the unbelievably widespread use of what were called 'big character' posters. The Party bureaucracy tried to redirect student anger from important to lesser targets by a variety of means, but nonetheless the condemnations grew and spread. Soon students began asking and discovering which local party people were implicated in the crimes of the schools.

Mao then wrote his own big character poster called "Bombard the Headquarters," and it called upon youth to carry through their criticism all the way up the party hierarchy so as to weed out those whom Mao called "capitalist roaders in authority." The student movement thus gained immediate confidence, legitimacy, and scope.

Students went all through the country on simulated Long Marches. They held demonstrations and sit-ins around whatever they didn't like including newspapers and even local party headquarters. Workers and all other people were then more directly affected and thus became more and more involved. People in every city were trying to displace old officials and replace them with others; sometimes it was politically well motivated and sometimes it had more to do with pursuit of wealth or power; in all cases countless factions grew up all over. In essence there were factions around legitimate Maoists, around pretender Maoists who actually had diverging views, and around outright self-interest seekers. In all cases rhetoric masked realities for all but the most initiated, and so for a long time there was considerable confusion. The conflicts were often fierce and violence (almost infinitesimal on a United States scale) frequently broke out. Millions turned out for demonstrations and in the end virtually no one went unaffected. The country resembled a giant university in which every kind of person was involved in very tense conflicts, discovering his or her own allegiances and then acting upon them.

The Cultural Revolution was simply the most recent in a long line of rectification campaigns aimed at undermining bourgeois ideas, actions, and attitudes. The nature of the involved contradictions, and the magnitude of efforts employed to solve them, made the campaign more complex than any that had gone before. Early on Mao realized that since the struggle was between 'him' and another sect of the party, he would have to engage as many non-party forces in the struggle as possible. His first move was to put Lin Piao in charge of the army where he then began a series of political campaigns around the publication of the Thoughts of Chairman Mao in the Little Red Book.

At the last plenum before the Cultural Revolution visibly began, the Maoist faction and the opposition faction led by Liu Shao Chi apparently both agreed that a wide sweeping rectification program was needed. Both groups felt that the period of the NEP had gone too far and that correctives were needed so as to put China back onto an acceptable course. Both groups were opposed to the consumerist market approaches of the new class of bureaucrats who rose out of the NEP. But each had a very different vision of the right way to go, a different conception of the obstructions to be dealt with, and very different ideas about how they might be overcome.

Mao felt it was necessary to have a bottom up campaign of criticism and popular democracy, while Liu's party faction felt it was necessary to have a campaign led by the party and aimed at increasing rather than diminishing party control. The Maoist approach won out to at least a respectable extent and, as the revolution unfolded, among other occurrences, Liu's men at the highest levels including Liu himself were made the focus of attention and finally removed from office.

To get a firmer grasp on the reasons behind the Cultural Revolution and the differences between Mao and the group he called the capitalist readers, we will have to speak a little more generally about the nature of revolution and especially revolution in industrially backward countries, though first it might be useful to round out our initial perceptions with some quotations from Lin Piao's speech to the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in 1969. First he quotes Mao:

In the past we waged struggles in rural areas, in factories, in the cultural field, and we carried out the socialist education movement. But all this failed to solve the problem because we didn't find a form, a method, to arouse the broad masses to express our dark aspect openly, in an all around way, and from below. 47

...this principle is absolutely correct. It correctly explains the relationship between revolution and production, between the superstructure and the economic base, and between the relations of production and the productive forces. Chairman Mao always teaches us: "Political work is the life blood of all economic work".... Politics is the concentrated expression of economics. If we fail to make a revolution in the superstructure, fail to arouse the broad masses of the peasants and the workers, fail to criticize the revisionist line, fail to expose the handful of renegades, enemy agents, capitalist readers in power, and counter-revolutionaries, and fail to consolidate the leadership of the proletariat, how can we further consolidate the socialist economic base and further develop the socialist productive forces? 48

Struggle criticism transformation in a factory, on the whole, goes through the following stages: Establishing a three in one revolutionary committee; carrying out mass criticism and repudiation; purifying the class ranks; consolidating the party organization; and simplifying the administrative structure, changing irrational rules and regulations and sending office workers to the workshops. 49

This wide dissemination of Mao Tse-tung Thought in a big country of 700 million is the most significant achievement of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 50

The class struggle under Socialism amounts to the bourgeoisie trying to remold the world to suit themselves while the working class tries to remold the world to suit working people. 52

In order to consolidate socialism the working class must not only transform the economic base of society but also the whole superstructure. The ideology, culture, customs, habits of the people must be transformed along with the institutions that reflect and perpetuate them such as schools, religious organizations, trade unions, peasant associations, theatre companies, orchestras, publishing houses, and scientific bodies. New music, art, literature, and drama must be created that is working class in content. Furthermore each individual must conduct an internal struggle to replace bourgeois individualism with proletarian collectivism as his or her motivating thought. Unless all this is carried through the socialist economic base cannot be consolidated. 53

Without a conscious and protracted effort to combat these (negative residue) tendencies they can grow into an important social force. They can and do create new bourgeois individuals who gather as a new privileged elite and ultimately as a new exploiting class. Thus socialism can be peacefully transformed back into capitalism. 54

Further in Hinton's view the key aspect of the Maoist understanding of two line struggle is the awareness that frequently it is at the ideological superstructural level that critical phenomena occur:

Mao, on the other hand, understood that the connection between productive forces, productive relations, and superstructure is dialectical and in constant interaction. Sometimes one aspect is decisive and at other times another. While the forces of production play a major role in determining the contours of human society, there are times when new productive relations are needed to release and develop new productive forces, when changes must be made in the superstructure to bring about changes in the base, times when consciousness determines being, rather than being determining consciousness. At such times massive political transformation is a prerequisite for further productive development. 55

Hinton thus sees the Cultural Revolution as a great rectification program to keep China on the socialist road, 1- by exposing and replacing people in authority taking the capitalist road, 2- by reasserting proletarian (revolutionary) politics and culture, and 3- by establishing the principles of continued contradictions and continued struggle even under socialism.

While we accept the bulk of Hinton's analysis as the Maoist position there are still many questions to be answered. What exactly is a capitalist reader, what were the differences between Mao and his 'opponents', and what were the other conflicts and reasons for the Cultural Revolution?

Franz Schurmann says that "as one reads the accusations one sees that the accusation 'capitalistic' meant more than wanting profits or private ownership; it meant authoritarianism, a love of power." 56 Technical scientists weren't attacked and their high income status went untouched. In fact only those who were consolidating gains into power or those who were supporting that process from positions of power were attacked.

In 1956 Mao made explicit his thesis that class struggle extends beyond the confiscation of property, and that the key question becomes whether there will be a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Huberman and Sweezy take off from this point in their analysis of the Cultural Revolution. They see the revolution as an attempt to deal with an enormously important historical problem,

...the growth in the socialist countries of an increasingly privileged and powerful social stratum in command of society's political and economic apparatus. Along with this growth and intricately connected with it, certain trends in the spiritual and moral spheres develop... The Chinese believe that these trends, if unchecked, must sooner or later culminate in the restoration of capitalism. If we understand them correctly, they do not mean by this that one fine day the state will sell the factories to a new class of wealthy capitalists, but rather that those in command will go on strengthening their positions and gradually transform them into transferable and inheritable property rights. 57

Huberman and Sweezy maintain that in a backward country those who have expertise must get enough material support to produce effectively, and further maintain that this is invariably more than what most people can get. As a result, in such circumstances, there is inevitable economic inequity brought on by uncontrollably divergent human needs and economic pressures. As the economy begins expanding, the privileges of certain groups increase in kind until finally that privilege begins creating vested interests which benefited groups try to defend. Here there is a correlation with Hinton's analysis stressing the on-going influences of old ideas and old behavior patterns: actually it is the dual presence of selfish and elitist attitudes and of privilege which allows each to grow until there are revisionist interest groups. And we add to the analysis only the realization that privilege need not take only a material form. The acquisition of influence, rights and powers by party cadres as they employ their expertise in planning (in an non-self-management type socialism) is a very real acquisition of privilege and is at least as important and as inevitable as the development of economic inequities. Certainly Mao's constant warnings against such trends show his awareness of this aspect of the whole problem.

Huberman and Sweezy point out that in third world countries it makes no sense to talk about completely preventing the growth of a privileged stratum which has the potential to become a new ruling class since that is part of the necessary price, of economic development (and of the 'necessary' initiation of central planning and inculcation of discipline). But in their view it does make sense to talk about limiting the power of this stratum, keeping its privileges to a necessary minimum, and preventing it from solidifying its position and transforming its interests into transferable property (or political) rights. Who has an interest in doing this? The non-privileged; but their interest, according to Huberman and Sweezy, is usually unfelt because of their old fashioned willingness to submit to authority or expertise. The only people with an immediately conscious interest are thus those who made the revolution and remain uncorrupted. Given the analysis, if these people are unsuccessful in stemming the 'new ruling class' trend, then according to Huberman and Sweezy, their country will take one or another version of what the Chinese have called the capitalist road.

The Maoist solution is not a purge to wipe out newly developing classes or corrupted party elements (the new Stalin would be worse than the old Liu), but the building of mass-based counter movements to keep new classes in check, and to create new cadres to replace those who become corrupted. Mao was intent upon dealing with all emerging problems in ways which wouldn't create new problems simultaneously in other areas -- his wish constantly led him to the masses as the chief vehicle of political rectification. The purpose was to stem bad trends, the means was mass-based movements, and the target was those who were misusing political or economic privilege and those in power who were supporting or ignoring such misuses. The 'offenders' were fought not with terror or force, but politically with mass mobilization and with educational campaigns conducted especially among youth and cadres. The goal was not only to right immediate wrongs but also to impede their reemergence by teaching long lasting political lessons to all concerned. The movement's 'targets' weren't evil people so much as good people who gave in to the evil dynamics of underdeveloped growth and Classical Leninist organization: a dynamic Mao seems to have at least in reasonable part escaped because of his deeply ingrained humanist and populist tendencies, and perhaps also because he was always in a good position to be quite objective -- nothing in China could seriously threaten his personal identity, interests, or leadership. He didn't have to worry about protecting himself or defending his own actions even sub-consciously, and he never seems to have internalized much of the kind of elitist, out-of-touch behavior that usually arises from, or leads to such kinds of subjectivity.

The goals of the Cultural Revolution were multiple but integrated. For Liu the problem developing in the sixties was the weakening of local party organs due to excessive restoration of capitalist techniques occurring in the countryside and even in the cities. His solution was to reassert party authority in ways that would continue to augment the powers of the newly emergent class of "red and expert" planning bureaucrats, managers, and party leaders. His faction had control of almost all the local and even city wide communist party committees.

But Mao saw the same rough situation in a completely different way. He had his long time populist tendencies, his trust in the masses, his ultimately libertarian goals, and the example of the degeneration of the Russian revolution guiding his thinking. He felt that restoration tendencies were out of hand and that politics had to be put back in command, but he was interested in accomplishing that end in ways that would further rather than undermine his ultimate goals. He chose the 'socialist road' of attacking the local and even national party structure by unleashing the fury of the students, workers, and peasants, at the 'bourgeois' headquarters. He felt that the revolution had to 'eliminate' those in power supporting the development of a new ruling class, but that it also had to create conditions that would make it increasingly more difficult for the same problems to arise again. He knew that the revolution should eliminate or at least begin to eliminate the vestiges of old thought that stubbornly hung on at every level of Chinese society. He saw the coming events as a great revolution that could touch people to their very souls and aim at solving the problems of their world outlook.

One cannot have a stable socialist society operating with the motivations of a capitalist society: if the motivations are not changed sooner or later there will be a reversion to a form of capitalism, for the old values of the old society will reassert themselves, helped by influences from outside of both the elite and dissident groups. 58

Man's social being determines his thinking. But thinking in turn plays a great role, or under certain circumstances a decisive role, in the development of the politics of the economy of a given society... In what does the old ideology of the exploiting classes lie? It lies essentially in self interest -- the natural soil for the growth of capitalism. This explains why it is necessary to start a great political and ideological revolution. It is a revolution to remold people to their very souls, to revolutionize their thinking. That is why in the course of this revolution we must "fight self". 59

A fundamental axiom of Maoist thought is that public ownership is only a technical condition for solving the problems of Chinese society. In a deeper sense the goal of Chinese socialism involves vast changes in human nature, in the way people relate to one another, to their work, and to society. The struggle to change material conditions, even in the most immediate sense, requires the struggle to change people, just as the struggle to change people depends on the ability to change the conditions under which men live and work. Mao differs from the Russians and from Liu Shao Chi's group, in believing that these changes are simultaneous not sequential. Concrete goals and human goals are separate only on paper -- in practice they are the same. Once the basic essentials of food, shelter, and clothing for .all have been achieved, it is not necessary to wait for higher productive levels to be reached before attempting socialist ways of life. 60

The goals of our cultural revolution are to workerize our intellectuals and intellectualize our workers. 61

The Chinese would for example certainly subscribe to Che's formulation of the fundamentally critical moral aspect of revolutionary development, even if he does perhaps give Marxism too much credit for fulfilling them:

Economic socialism without communist morality does not interest me. We are fighting against poverty, yes, but also against alienation. One of the fundamental aims of Marxism is to bring about the disappearance of material interest, the "what's in it for me" factor, and profit from men's psychological motivation. Marx was concerned equally with economic facts and with their translations into men's minds. He called that a "fact of consciousness." If communism fails to pay attention to the facts of consciousness it may be a method of distribution, but it is no longer a revolutionary morality. 62

The main issue, the real issue was the right to rebel -- to rebel against the bureaucrats and their flunkies the young communists.... The main issue was that youth should directly experiment with the revolution. 63

Most of our questions are finally answered. The Cultural Revolution was a large scale tactic aimed at overcoming developmental problems, economic problems, ideological problems, and party authoritarianism problems so as to insure the continuing development rather than the backsliding of the revolution. As Huberman and Sweezy point out:

There is no guarantee that the cultural revolution will attain its objective, the difficulty of preventing a reversion to class rule in an underdeveloped socialist society is much greater than most Marxists have yet recognized. It is not only that the growth of a privileged stratum is unavoidable but also that old ideas and habits of thought, old world attitudes, ingrained moral and religious values, are enormously persistent and difficult to eradicate; and their very existence creates a soil which is receptive to the seeds of privilege and exploitation. At this stage we can only say that the Chinese have seen more clearly than anyone else both sides of this vast problem and are making the only kinds of efforts to solve it which seem to have any chance of success. One thing is certain, terror will not solve it. What the Chinese are now calling "extensive democracy" may. 64

Whether Mao is consciously aware of the bureaucratic limitations of Leninist organizational principles is problematic; even if he has arrived at such a conclusion, it would be impossible for him to acknowledge it without renouncing the entire Leninist heritage to which he lays claim, and within which he claims to have made creative innovations. But Mao has adopted new means and methods which implicitly reject the institutionalized, bureaucratic pattern of post revolutionary development that so logically flows from Leninism, and Mao is sufficiently non-Leninist to question the revolutionary legitimacy of the Leninist party itself. 67

Thus the Chinese experience bears out our earlier criticisms of Classical Marxism Leninism while pointing in essentially the same directions as did our own corrective intuitions. Mao had to call himself a Classical Marxist Leninist and even a Stalinist though in fact his political awareness was much richer than their Classical ones. It improved the Classical approaches in many ways (though admittedly also only moderately altering or even exactly recreating certain other failings). It in some senses synthesized certain positive Classical Marxist Leninist and Anarchist views. Before concluding our discussion of Maoism we must here briefly round it out by summarizing how Maoist theory and strategy 1- go beyond Classical formulations, 2- aid us in moving towards a new political consciousness, and 3- still fall short of so aiding us.

THE MAOIST THEORY OF CONTRADICTIONS

The correctness or incorrectness of the Maoist theory of contradictions is not really an issue, for it is methodology and thus conceptually definitional. What is important is its power in guiding analysis and in then organizing the results of analysis, manipulating those results, and drawing conclusions from them. This section's main orientation is thus to look at the concrete use value of the theory rather than at its abstract and actually tautological rightness-wrongness.

Moreover we are interested in the theory's use value in the United States and not in China. That is, we consider how well it could guide North American analysis, given the specific character traits common amongst the North Americans who would use it. Though we're not prepared to forcefully argue the point, there is an implicit assertion that the analysis is also applicable to China, but to only a lesser degree because Chinese culture and conditions are such that 'Chinese using the theory' can do better than 'North Americans using the theory'.

Thus to begin with, we feel that the Maoist emphasis on primary contradictions is misleading and generally quite impossible to effectively apply.

How does one determine the primary contradiction of an unfolding historical process -- surely such determinations are contingent affairs. Take the case where feudal society is rupturing due to an imminent bourgeois revolution. Is the ensuing chaos a manifestation of a primary contradiction or is it merely the resolution of a minor one while the primary one, between perhaps the class nature of society and the humanness of people, is still to unfold? There is no real single right answer to the question. It depends upon how we define process and what time periods we consider.

The primary contradiction in the unfolding of all history is still unknown. The primary contradiction in the disruption of feudalism is supposedly known. Which was more important at any particular moment seems like a meaningless question. Until tomorrow we don't really know for sure what today's primary contradiction was, and even then we probably won't. Were the contradictions in pre-Nazi Germany that created the Third Reich primary, or were they merely secondary and less important than the slowly emerging contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie? There seems to be no objective criteria for any of these determinations except after the fact.

(Further even, though as a bit of an aside, there is also a problem in figuring how one should even define what is the system within which one is looking for a primary contradiction. How did Mao know when to define his system as China and look within, and when to define it as China plus the imperialists, thus looking within/without? Of course one can answer he used common sense, but that is not really a built-in part of the methodology, and in any case not quite as common in most people as it seems to have been in Mao. The United States parallel is, if one is to use the primary contradiction approach, how does one know whether to look for it within United States borders or within the entire United States imperialist system, or within the entire world system?)

North American Maoists claim that when the chosen primary contradiction of a process is seen to be less important than expected, an error is at fault -- an error by practitioners and not by the original theoreticians. In the abstract this is of course quite correct, but it solves nothing.

The real crux of the situation is that if this inflexible approach is used, errors are almost inevitable, and that once they are made they tend to be exaggerated rather than uncovered and reversed. Most especially in the United States, the extremism of the methodology couples powerfully and destructively with the extremism of the users. Here there is already a strong culturally enforced tendency to polarize and dichotomize, and it is enhanced rather than corrected by the theory, despite Mao's continual warnings of that very possibility.

A North American Maoist picks a primary contradiction even though the choice is historically problematic; he then views all surroundings in terms of that contradiction. Naturally it begins looking more and more central -- the Maoist becomes inexorably but unjustifiably more sure of the validity of his original guess. The Maoist dialectical method pushes the practitioner toward final determinations and away from patient flexibility; it fixates him, and its methods substantiate themselves independently of their real validity. As we'll see, the Maoist theory of knowledge provides only minimal insight for offsetting the process. Mao's warnings provide more, but they are not well heard or heeded in day-to-day North American political struggles. Further perhaps, Chinese culture also provides significant obstacles to the development of these problems, but again these are not operative here, and indeed their North American counterpart cultural forces likely act in opposite directions. Thus we have an argument for the low use value of the Maoist theory of contradictions, or at least of the Maoist theory of contradictions unaltered to fit the United States consciousness context or unaided by complementary methodologies. It has a certain unity of theory and practice, but at least in the North American setting, very likely it is an uncorrective one.

Aside from the ways such fixations invade the body of general Maoist analysis inside the United States, the best examples of the 'primariness fixation' problem arise from the practice of Leninist sects trying to understand and change America. The Labor Committee, as just the limited paradigm case, felt for a long time that a particular strike in New Jersey was central to all United States occurrences and more important than any. They totally fixated on the one strike (later on others, on CIA plots, etc.) and reorganized the rest of their perceptions to comply. At anti-war meetings their action proposals inevitably centered in one or another abstruse way on the need to relate to their primary contradiction strike or whatever. And though this is a ridiculously extreme example it is only a hair more so than dozens of others that could be picked from the practice of other sects. With regard to understanding campus activities, local community activities, strike potentials, etc., Classical Marxist Leninists continually focus on one aspect or another to the virtual exclusion of a total understanding. Further, they do it tenaciously, quite as if their entire welfare or identity depended upon doing it. Maoism's particular dialectical entreaties partially cause this fetishism and in the United States they certainly do nothing effective to prevent it.

In reality all observations are tentative. Almost all conditions are alterable by history's course and almost all perceptions are subject to error. It seems reasonable to conclude that it is foolhardy and even arrogant to try to distinguish particular contradictions, forces, ideas, or whatever as permanently dominant. In a complex society with many spheres interacting and many contradictions, rather than saying that one contradiction manifests itself in all spheres and in the resolution of all other contradictions dominantly, it seems likely it would be more fruitful to start from the perspective that almost all contradictions manifest themselves in all spheres and in all other contradictions. That way there is some possibility that the already large 'natural' tendencies to dichotomize and be inflexible will be offset to some degree. There is more probability of a balanced rather than a fixated description and thus there is a higher likelihood of good prediction, and perhaps also a lesser tendency to rush to conclusions and cling to them despite mounting counter evidences.

Thus it might be wise to stress the idea that 'every' contradiction contains the 'conditions' of every other, and that they all generally develop as an interacting totality where dominance is not so much the important factor, as mutuality and intersection of causes and effects. But for now it suffices to say that the Maoist theory of the primary contradiction is difficult if not impossible to use undogmatically, and further that it tends to push people toward viewing things as being more isolated from one another than they really are.

Any social class has internal contradictions -- as one example, its members' consciousnesses can be either trade unionist or revolutionary about a certain issue -- and if the process of resolution is under way, how does one determine which aspect is dominant and what the extent of its dominance is? In reality their are obviously gradations: various numbers of people can have one or another consciousness, and various individuals (undergoing a personal process parallel to the larger group one) might well be torn between the two forms of consciousness, partially accepting each. The Maoist often tends to miss the complexity of this situation in the effort to make it correspond to simplistic expectations. And it simply doesn't do to say this is the practitioner's fault. There is little or nothing in the theory that opts against such error and in any case one doesn't judge a theory solely by its abstract value but also by its value as it's used by real struggling people.

These criticisms don't seem too different than ones we made previously of the Classical Marxist Leninists. We might deduce, and could show with some effort, that that is precisely because they are holdover weaknesses, offset a bit by a newer better formulation, warned against very strongly by Mao, perhaps less operative and therefore less important in a Chinese context, but still present nonetheless and certainly of significant consequence in any evaluation of Maoist theory for use in guiding United States practice.

To continue, and for a while in the same general vein, the Maoist definition of the principal aspect of a contradiction and of the ways its nature defines the nature of the system of which it is a part, is also highly ambiguous.

A more reasonable formulation of the principal aspect proposition might say that at any given time a system gets its overall nature from all the characteristics of all the various aspects of all its contradictions. In any case it is reasonably safe to assert that one's knowledge of any system is likely valid insofar as it evolves from a totalistic balanced evaluation, and likely problematic insofar as it stems from inflexible perceptions about which contradictions and aspects are central and which are not.

Although this type of critique is still at a level far removed from concrete practical situations, we see that it does again imply the kinds of problems Leninist and United States Maoist practice almost always evidences: harping on one contradiction, harping on one aspect of a person's or a group's attributes, working totally from "line" to "line," missing the whole for the part etc. etc.

Perhaps the theory of dialectics has often been formulated in regimented form because it increases its appeal by making it seem more precise and more scientific, and perhaps because the weaknesses of its practitioners simply push them inexorably toward using it that way. In any case the result is a reality that leads to errors of analysis not only in the original efforts of people employing the dialectical method, but also in the whole body of Maoist theory as developed in the United States context.

The lessons of the earlier presentation of Mao's theory of contradictions, of the effects of that theory on Chinese practice, and of the above criticisms seem relatively straightforward: the extension of methodology to non-macro situations is a great gain. The recognition of and warnings about tendencies to dichotomize and fixate and so on, are enlightening but insufficient to the North American situation. Either adaptation of the methodology or one or more additional augmenting ones is needed. The extension of the concept of contradiction to non-antagonistic situations is a major advance allowing broader, and more pertinent to day-to-day affairs, analyses. Our understanding of these evaluations which springs from our discussion of the whole Chinese experience should be somewhat elaborated in the next three brief concluding sections.

THE MAOIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Many of our earlier criticisms of the Classical Marxist formulation apply to the Maoist one too. The major gains are the new emphasis on understanding and guarding against dogmatism, the new clarity, and the new applicability to actually guiding one's thought processes. The main problems are the continued belief that practice-theory-practice leads inexorably toward (if only one is careful enough), and the associated and still critical absence of a theory explaining the relation of personality, needs, habits, and whatever else from the psychological realm, to the problems of consciousness and motivation, and thus to the problems of political activism. The lessons are that a new theory should continue moving toward in guaranteeing its own growth tendencies, define its understandings well and clearly enough so that it has high day-to-day use value, and introduce enough of a psychological understanding to answer the many critically psychologically related and quite pressing questions -- not by way of some leaders 'great genius,' which in the United States is highly unlikely to exist and if it did exist likely to be counter-productive anyway -- but by way of a generalized commonly-held political awareness.

GENERAL THEORETIC RESULTS

Maoism's broader understanding of social groups, better understanding of revolutionaries, better humanistic-materialistic balance, and greater emphasis on the importance of human character, all suggest directions of possible continued improvement in a 'new United States revolutionary consciousness'. The gains over Classical Marxism are considerable. The view of history and of the roles of groups within it is far more flexible, the understanding of the importance of politics versus the importance of economics is enlightening, and the broader understanding of revolution and of socialism is certainly also a significant advance. The major remaining weaknesses are a still too shallow understanding of human nature and personality and the derivative absence of a significant understanding of racism, sexism, and perhaps authoritarianism. The lesson is that in addition to broadening or repairing methodology, we must obviously also fill in these gaps in any new theory proposed for present United States use.

GENERAL STRATEGIC RESULTS

Obviously Maoism grows off a Leninist strategic root but vastly alters it. It seems to us that it is the direction of alteration that contains the easiest and most important lesson to learn. Mechanicalness, hierarchy, authoritarianism, unconsciousness of means as opposed to ends, unconsciousness of the importance of personality, etc. all diminish in Maoism. The Chinese strategic experience teaches abstract principles of conflict, the extreme importance of political consciousness, the extreme importance of tactics based not only on class analysis but on other social group and even individual person analysis as well, the need for understanding and overcoming problems of central leadership and of lacks of coordination, the need for approaches that bring together all potential allies, the need for overcoming bureaucracy, the importance of cultural and other superstructural issues, and so on, but to try to draw more specific conclusions is laden with difficulty because of the differences between United States and Chinese contexts -- two examples should suffice to prove the point.

In China the setting up of Red Bases, and the partitioning of land to improve material conditions of life played very critical roles in Maoist success. One North American Maoist might well suggest that the lesson for the United States is that developing independent institutions and increasing their power base while simultaneously winning reform demands, aimed at material well being, is central to winning. Another, and we think wiser, North American Maoist might argue instead that developing power within institutions and struggling for ideological and 'governmental' hegemony right there is parallel to Mao's creating Red Bases. A completely different style of life, filling a variety of needs, most especially the need for self-management in a context of sought and won material gains is analogous to Maoism's land redistributions.

In any case it's clear that the problem of deciding strategies for the United States can be aided by studying Chinese approaches, but can only be finally resolved by evaluation through indigenous theory and practice.

Consider as the second example the Chinese method of resolving contradictions within the revolutionary movement or between it and peoples it encounters: criticism self-criticism. All accounts suggest that it was and remains a very effective part of Chinese revolutionary practice. Should we import it? The answer can obviously only revolve around the method's applicability here and not there. In fact new left practice suggested it was not so useful as advance notices portended. Analysis explained that in our society, where competition is one of the pervasive weaknesses, a system of correction based upon finding and announcing weaknesses in one another tended toward back-biting counter productivity, or toward sterile ineffectiveness brought on by defensively avoiding most important or most vulnerable issues. The lesson might well be that the method altered or that the method augmented by another might be effective, while the method in its original form is not.

In any case these specific strategic problems must really await the task of finally drawing lessons from our whole analysis and of then moving on toward new approaches of our own.

For now we must finish out the discussion of the Chinese experience by considering its contributions to revolutionary understandings of societal transitions.

Thus the key strategic lessons of Maoism are not the specifics but the trends toward alteration of Classical Leninism which must be brought even further here in the United States. Maoism hasn't developed alternatives to Leninism but has only reformed and continually struggled to prevent or rectify Leninism's worst effects. As a result it substantiates our critical perceptions of Classical Leninism and shows us directions to pursue but Maoism does not, by any means, supply a model we can slavishly or even flexibly copy. Indeed, only history will show whether Maoist 'reforms' of Classical Leninism were ideal or finally successful in the Chinese context.

GENERAL GOAL RESULTS

Maoist lessons concerning revolutionary goals evolve directly from Maoist theoretical gains. The Maoists tell us that while revolution immediately creates vast changes it does not eliminate all old institutions, old consciousness, old motivations, or old personality types. They tell us that the vestiges of the old society within the recently revolutionized one have the capacity to corrupt its functioning and cause reactionary or even oppressively restorative dynamics. They show us how revolutionary goals must address the full panoply of human needs rather than just the material ones; how they must address efficiency, yes, but also human well being and continued political growth. The Maoists thus make fundamentally clear that revolutionary societies still contain important contradictions and that successful revolutionary programs can't assume continual progress, but must rather create it by addressing reactionary and potentially revolutionary forces at both the institutional and the politico-cultural levels. Whether or not Maoist practice proves itself to have understood these lessons and thereby succeeds, or whether it shows itself instead bound by hierarchically and ideologically induced weaknesses and falls into oppressive days remains to be seen. In either case the validity of the awarenesses and their applicability to all other revolutionary efforts is in no doubt and must be incorporated into future United States ideology and practice.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mao in Selected Works and Little Red Book, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China.

2. See Karol's discussion of the relevant quotations in the Little Red Book.

3. Mao, "On Contradiction", Selected Works, Volume One, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China.

4. ibid. 314

5. ibid. 315

6. ibid. 333

7. ibid. 333

8. ibid. 315

9. ibid. 331

10. ibid. 316

11. ibid. 320

12. ibid. 322

13. ibid. 321

14. ibid. 343-344

15. ibid. 344

16. ibid. Mao, "On Practice", op. cit. 293-298

17. ibid. 300

18. ibid. 306

19. ibid. 306

20. ibid. 308

21. ibid.

22. Mao, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", Selected Works, op. cit.

23. Mao, Selected Works, op. cit.

24. Mao, "The Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside", Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China. 287

25. See McFarlane and Wheelwright, The Chinese Road to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York.

26. Mao, "The United Front in Cultural Work," in Selected Works, op. cit.

27. For all this see especially McFarlane and Wheelwright, The Chinese Road to Socialism, op. cit.

28. And yet it is of course true that at any time the Leninist aspects could move to dominance and corrupt the other better ideas and ways.

29. Mao, "The Struggle in Chinkiang Mountain," in Selected Works, op. cit.

30. Mao, "The Tasks of 1945," in Selected Works, op. cit.

31. Mao, "On Coalition Government", Selected Works, op. cit.

32. Mao, Preface to "Rural Surveys," Selected Works, op. cit.

33. Mao, "Our Study and the Current Situation," Selected Works, op. cit.

34. Mao, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the Nationalist War," Selected Works, op. cit.

35. Mao in Karol, op. cit.

36. Mao, the "Tasks of 1945," op. cit.

37. Mao, "The Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China.

38. Karol, op. cit.

39. See Mao, "Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", op. cit.

40. Mao, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," Selected Works, op. cit.

41. Mao, Selected Works, op. cit.

42. Wheelwright and McFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y. 32-33

43. Karol, op. cit.

44. Mao, "On Handling of Contradictions Among the People," op. cit.

45. Mao in Wheelwright and McFarlane, op. cit.

46. Wheelwright and McFarlane, op. cit. 67

47. Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China," Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China.

48. ibid.

49. ibid.

50. ibid.

51. Hinton, Turning Point in China, Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y.

52. ibid. 25

53. ibid. 19

54. ibid. 21

55. ibid. 43-44

56. Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, University of California Press, Berkeley, California.

57. Paul Sweezy, The Cultural Revolution, New England Free Press Pamphlet, Boston, Ma.

58. Wheelwright and McFarlane, op. cit. 155

59. Quoted in Wheelwright and McFarlane, op. cit. 157

60. Wheelwright and McFarlane, op. cit.

61. Chou En Lai, "Important Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China.

62. Che quoted in Long, The Marxism of Che Guevara, Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y. 65-66

63. Chris Milton in a New England Free Press Interview Pamphlet.

64. Sweezy, op. cit.

65. Meisner in the China Quarterly, Jan-March 1971. 29

66. ibid. 30

67. ibid. 31

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