In the 19th century, the British deterrent prevented US dominance of the hemisphere. But the conception of "our confederacy" as "the nest, from which all America, North and South, is to be peopled" (Thomas Jefferson) was firmly implanted, along with his corollary that it is best for Spain to rule until "our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them piece by piece."⁶

There were internal conflicts over the matter. American merchants "were eager to contribute to the cause of freedom -- as long as the rebels were able to pay, preferably cash," Gleijeses notes. And the well-established tradition of piracy provided a reservoir of American ship owners and seamen (British too) who were happy to offer their services as privateers to attack Spanish shipping, though extension of their terrorist vocation to American vessels led to much moral outrage and a government crackdown. Apart from England, liberated Haiti also provided assistance to the cause of independence, but on the condition that slaves be freed. Haiti too was a dangerous rotten apple, punished for independence in a manner to which we return in chapter 8.

The concept of Panamericanism advanced by Bolívar was diametrically opposed to that of the Monroe Doctrine at the same time. A British official wrote in 1916 that while Bolívar originated the idea of Panamericanism, he "did not contemplate the consummation of his policy under the aegis of the United States." In the end, it was "Monroe's victory and Bolívar's defeat," Gleijeses comments.

The status of Cuba was of particular significance, a striking illustration of the resilience of traditional themes. The US was firmly opposed to the independence of Cuba, "strategically situated and rich in sugar and slaves" (Gleijeses). Jefferson advised President Madison to offer Napoleon a free hand in Spanish America in return for the gift of Cuba to the United States. The US should not go to war for Cuba, he wrote to President Monroe in 1823, "but the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the Island will give itself to us, when able to do so." Secretary of State John Quincy Adams described Cuba as "an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union." He too urged Spanish sovereignty until Cuba would fall into US hands by "the laws of political...gravitation," a "ripe fruit" for harvest. Support for Spanish rule was near universal in the Executive branch and Congress; European powers, Colombia, and Mexico were approached for assistance in the endeavor of blocking the liberation of Cuba. A prime concern was the democratic tendencies in the Cuban independence movement, which advocated abolition of slavery and equal rights for all. There was again a threat that "the rot would spread," even to our own shores.⁷

By the end of the 19th century, the US was powerful enough to ignore the British deterrent and conquer Cuba, just in time to prevent the success of the indigenous liberation struggle. Standard doctrines justified relegating Cuba to virtual colonial status. Cubans were "ignorant niggers, half-breeds, and dagoes," the New York press observed; "a lot of degenerates...no more capable of self-government than the savages of Africa," the military command added. The US imposed the rule of the white propertied classes, who had no weird notions about democracy, freedom, and equal rights, and were thus not degenerates. The "ripe fruit" was converted to a US plantation, terminating the prospects for successful independent development.⁸

With US economic and political domination of the region well established a generation later, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt initiated his "Good Neighbor Policy"; market forces are the most efficient device of control, if they suffice. First, however, it was necessary to overturn the government of Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín, which would be a threat to US "commercial and export interests in Cuba," Ambassador Sumner Welles advised. The ranking expert on Latin America, Welles was particularly disturbed that workers had taken over sugar mills and set up what he called a "soviet government" in them. There can be "no confidence either in the policies nor stability of this regime," he informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who told the press that the US would "welcome any government representing the will of the people of the Republic and capable of maintaining law and order throughout the island" -- not the Grau government. Welles conceded that law and order were being maintained, but this appearance of stability was only "the quiet of panic," he explained. It was a situation of "passive anarchy," State Department adviser Adolf Berle added, another term that perhaps finds its place alongside of "logical illogicality."

FDR told the press that Grau was backed only by "his local army" of 1500 men "and a bunch of students," a government lacking any legitimacy. Welles's replacement, Jefferson Caffery, testified later as to the "unpopularity with all the better classes in the country of the de facto [Grau] government," which was "supported only by the army and ignorant masses." When the US-backed Mendieta government that replaced Grau had problems subduing the population, Caffery explained further that "in numbers, the ignorant masses of Cuba reach a very high figure."

Roosevelt's refusal to recognize the Grau government "meant in effect an economic strangulation of the island," David Green points out, "since the United States would not negotiate a new sugar purchase agreement with a government it did not recognize," and the dependent economy could not survive without one. Army Chief of Staff Fulgencio Batista understood the message, and threw his support to opposition leader Carlos Mendieta, who replaced Grau and was immediately recognized by Washington. Relations were readjusted, with the result that Cuba became more fully incorporated "within the protective system of the United States," a member of the US Tariff Commission noted. The US retained effective control over Cuban affairs, keeping its highly stratified and repressive internal social system intact along with the dominant role of foreign enterprise.⁹

⁶ Jefferson cited by van Alstyne, Rising American Empire, 81.

⁷ Gleijeses, "Limits of Sympathy." Drinnon, White Savage, 158. Also PI, 12f., 71f., and sources cited.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Green, Containment, 13-18. On the Good Neighbor Policy and its backgrounds, see LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions; Krenn, US Policy. See also Salisbury, Anti-Imperialism.