Year 501 Copyright © 1993 by Noam Chomsky. Published by South End Press.
Chapter 7: World Orders Old and New: Latin America Segment 3/17
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The occasional exceptions highlighted the point. Washington agreed to finance a Brazilian steel project, but as government economist Simon Hanson pointed out, that meant only a "shift in the type" of American steel exports to Brazil, not a loss in total volume or value: the Brazilian plant would produce "the simpler manufactured products," which in turn would "require import of more complex materials" requiring more advanced technology; that "is where we come in," keeping US export markets safe. An analysis concluded that "the countries who will lose most of the Brazil business which will ultimately be handled by this plant are England and Germany."7

Quite generally, Haines observes, US leaders "opposed major industrialization plans of the Third World nations and rejected foreign aid programs based on public loans to promote economic growth." They preferred a "mercantilist approach," with Third World economies integrated "into their U.S.-dominated free trade system"; the concept of "mercantilist free trade" captures nicely the doctrinal framework. The US "tried to guide and control Brazilian industrial development for the benefit of private U.S.corporations and to fit Brazil into its regional economic plans." The humanitarian Point Four program, which was to be "a model for all Latin America," was designed "to develop larger and more efficient sources of supply for the American economy, as well as create expanded markets for U.S. exports and expanded opportunities for the investment of American capital."

What US planners "envisioned, but seldom stated, was a neocolonial relationship, with Brazil furnishing the raw materials for American industry and the United States supplying Brazil with manufactured goods." They pursued a "neocolonial, neomercantilist policy" -- which is, somehow, "a classic liberal approach to development," showing again how flexible an instrument economic theory can be. Industrial development was tolerable only if it was "complementary to U.S. industry." The basic concept was "that Brazilian development was all right as long as it did not interfere with American profits and dominance," and ample profit remittance was guaranteed. Agricultural development was also promoted, as long as it avoided "destabilizing" programs like land reform, relied on US farm equipment, fostered "commodities that complemented US production, such as coffee, cacao, rubber, and jute," and created "new markets for U.S. agricultural commodities" such as dairy products and wheat.

"Brazilian desires were secondary," Haines observes, though it was useful "to pat them a little bit and make them think that you are fond of them," in Dulles's words.

The Cold War framework was in place at once. By 1946, Soviet machinations in Brazil were of much concern to Ambassador Adolf Berle, a leading liberal statesman from the New Deal through Kennedy's New Frontier. The Russians are like the Nazis, he warned: "Horribly, cynically, and terribly, they exploit any center of thought or action which may make trouble for the United States"; they are so unlike us, in this regard. Intelligence could detect no Soviet trouble-making in Brazil apart from economic missions and other common practices. But as usual, that conclusion was not considered relevant, and Berle's position was endorsed. As Haines summarizes an intelligence report a few months later, "the Soviet Union might conceivably find it to its advantage in the future to fish in troubled inter-American waters," so no chances could be taken, another illustration of the "logical illogicality" that governed global policy planning. The potential Communists must be eliminated before they have a chance to interfere with our pursuit of our goals.

US leaders used Brazil as a "testing area for modern scientific methods of industrial development," Haines observes. US experts provided instructions on all sorts of topics. For example, they encouraged Brazilians to open the Amazon to development and to follow the US model of railroad operation -- the latter a touch of black humor, perhaps. But crucially, they provided Brazil with sincere advice on how to benefit US corporations.

Throughout, Haines's account is interlarded with such phrases as "the best of intentions," "sincerely believed," etc. By lucky accident, what was "sincerely believed" conformed nicely to the interests of US investors, however ruinous it might be to our wards. Again, Haines strikes traditional chords, including the faith in the benign intent that so miraculously serves self-interest.


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7Green, Containment, 74f., 315n.; ch. 2.1, above.