"Israel’s decision makers [from 1949 through the present] were as reluctant and risk averse when it came to making peace as they were daring and trigger happy when it came to making war. Second, the official Israeli decision makers typically did not initiate peace overtures; most of the peace initiatives in the Arab-Israeli conflict came either from the Arab world, from the international community, or from grass-roots and informal channels. Third, when Israel was willing to take risks for peace, they usually paid off. The Arabs generally showed a remarkable tendency for compliance with their treaty obligations. In quite a few cases, it was Israel – rather than the Arabs – that violated formal and informal agreements."
Maoz also points out that when Israel took "risks for peace" those risks entailed little risks at all or after being shown the risks of not accepting peace.
For example, in 1971 Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat offered Israel peace. Israel rejected. In 1973 Egypt attacked Israel and showed it was militarily stronger than Israel thought. Israel then accepted peace.
Israel accepted peace from Jordan but there was no risk, no cost. Pretty much Jordan capitulated to Israel.
From 1953 to 1979 Israel accepted peace from Iran, but again it received more than it gave.
Israel’s motives for peace or the denying of it has largely centered around its malignantly perceived self-interests, which Maoz attributes to the domination of the security establishment within Israeli politics.