Intelligence: 1. the ability to learn, understand and make judgments or have opinions that are based on reason.
2. secret information about the governments of other countries, especially enemy governments.
Recent statements by the political leaders of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ suggest that there was no choice but to invade Iraq because of ‘intelligence’. Decisions to go to war are political ones. No briefing paper or strategic review removes the need for the decision making process. This should, one hopes, involve intelligence of the first type being applied to the second.
During Gulf War II, media scrutiny and much ridicule were directed towards the Iraqi Minister for Information, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf (‘Comical Ali’) who, on camera, famously denied the presence of coalition forces in Baghdad, while explosions and tanks could be seen in the background. He later explained to Arab TV that his information came from “authentic sources – many authentic sources”, ie. ‘intelligence’. The media attention was appropriate, as propaganda has earned for itself a well-deserved pejorative meaning.
Outright lies such as al-Sahhaf ‘s are only the most obvious and easily guarded against form of persuasion. Exposure leads to loss of credibility which makes future lies all the more difficult to pass off. More insidious and more important are subtle techniques such as selective omission, logical fallacies, naming and agenda setting. Here the media should play the same role as in the case of al-Sahhaf – exposure, and framing future statements within this context. Clearly in the case of al-Sahhaf, the media had no trouble in calling it what it actually was – propaganda. These more subtle techniques require a critical eye and an understanding of propaganda and mass communication. This should be the role of media professionals, but the ‘liberal press’ seem to have great difficulty in doing this when considering claims made by their own Governments. The current crisis in confidence in the intelligence services is curious. Media reporting might give the impression that doubts about the case for war have only recently begun to surface. Reports by UNMOVIC in February and March last year revealed their inability to confirm many of the claims made in the British dossier and in Colin Powell’s address to the UN on February 5th. An early February report in Newsweek also highlighted testimony by Saddam’s son-in-law, who claimed that Iraq had destroyed all its chemical and biological weapons. This is the type of ‘intelligence’ that didn’t make it into the British dossier, Powell’s speech or other public pronouncements. Aluminum tubes, uranium contracts, drone aircraft – all debunked or seriously questioned prior to the start of the war. But reports in the media continue to suggest that the doubts are a new phenomenon. Writing in Australia’s leading national daily, The Australian, Michael Costa states that, “If these reports prove correct [that Iraq did not have WMD] that would be relevant if that had been known at the time” (1). Despite later certainty about Iraq’s weapons capability, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard said in Parliament in September 2002, that
“The most compelling piece of evidence to me that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and retains her nuclear aspiration is that Iraq will not let inspectors in” (2).
Yet when UNMOVIC did enter Iraq two months later, Mr. Howard seemed unable to follow his own reasoning to its logical conclusion.
On February 5th, 2004, Mr. Howard commented on the, so far, non-existent weapons that, “I am not embarrassed … because intelligence is an imprecise science” (3). This is precisely the kind of qualifying statement missing from almost all the pre-war discussion. Newspaper editorials followed suit, “Rather than a political plot, perhaps the intelligence services got it badly wrong in the advice they gave.” (4).
The “Comical Ali” moment had clearly arrived by March 2003 with Hans Blix’s final report to the Security Council. Despite the lack of evidence, state leaders continued the mantra of certainty and their “belief” in Iraq’s weapons. No doubt ‘Comical Ali’ too, really believed there were no coalition troops in Baghdad, but naturally western media did not reproduce his claims as serious, based on the strength of his own beliefs. On the ‘Coalition’ side there has been no lack of our own ‘Comical Ali’s’ standing in front of cameras and saying in effect – ‘The tanks really are there, just look harder and you’ll see them’. This reflects a type of pragmatism – that the consequences of holding a belief are the test of its’ truth. Believing in Iraq’s weapons was extremely useful when it came to arguing for war, and therefore, they must exist. This is an example of ‘desirable belief’, the dangers of which are clear enough, as Bertrand Russell explained when he called it, “a certain kind of madness”. Just one week after this final UNMOVIC report, Mr Howard stated that we must ensure, “…that Iraq has its chemical and biological weapons taken from it…” and that, “Possession of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by terrorists ….is why we must be intensely concerned about Iraq.” (5).
The last statement demonstrates a number of rhetorical devices useful to the propagandist. Gaining attention to the message is vital and there is no better way than by overstating a threat or linking it to a topical issue of real concern, such as terrorism. This also plays well at an emotional level, raising the fearful possible consequences of inaction. Such emotional appeals help to distract questions away from the believability of the actual claim. Simultaneously, Iraq is linked with an unfavourable image, that of Al-Qaida and terrorism. This also serves to suggest that the two were working together without actually claiming it to be so. But as the CIA had stated, there was no evidence of a link between them. What western leaders, such as Mr Howard, were striving to do with their bold claims of certainty was to give the appearance of evidence were there was suspicion and allegation. Lending their own credibility, as political leaders, to the claim helped give it weight when it may have had little of its own. The successful practice of propaganda is highly dependant on not being seen to do so. This is achieved by ambiguity and by suggesting and encouraging desired beliefs. Repetition helps. This was most clear with the example of Iraq and Al-Qaida, which was also used extensively in the US. The omission of caveats and qualifying statements gave a much more frightening picture of the threat posed by Iraq. Overall the aim was to encourage people to form an opinion, determined in advance by the propagandist, without reviewing the evidence that supported it, or by overlooking certain aspects of the truth that might not.
Given the choice between blaming intelligence agencies for ‘intelligence failure’ or taking the rap themselves for the unethical use of persuasion, governments are understandably lining up to conduct inquires into how the intelligence agencies ‘got it wrong’. Mr. Howard seems to be now following suit, even though one of the reasons he gave for Australia’s decision to go to war, that “Australia’s alliance with the United States is also a factor”(5). While this was given as only part of the reason, an honest assessment might conclude it was the primary reason, just as it was for ‘New Europe’. As an excuse ‘Intelligence failure’ has about the same credibility as ‘the dog ate my homework’. The only real reason that the Australian Government had for committing itself to actions that were not supported by evidence, was that it didn’t care much about any objective reality, besides demonstrating the reliability of Australia in the “alliance”.
Now that pressure is rising over the lack of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq, media focus seems to be following the lead set by political leaders, who proclaim that the issue is one of ‘intelligence’ and its failures. No doubt Minister al-Sahhaf also later lamented the inadequacy of his ‘intelligence’, but naturally, and justly, no one gave him the time of day. What the response in the Australian media clearly lacks is framing current claims in the context of previous claims (dubious even at the time), made by the same leaders and contrasting that with the readily available information that cast doubt on the case for war. This requires the ability and willingness to understand, recognize and name these actions for what they are – propaganda. In the coming weeks we can expect to hear the phrase ‘intelligence failure’ even more frequently as Governments divert attention to this lesser problem (as if intelligence as ever been anything other than an “imprecise science”), rather than on the systematic and unethical use of techniques of persuasion on their own citizens. The greatest ‘intelligence failure’ has been that of the media in failing to catalogue and remind the public of the extent to which claims that were suspect or disproven even before the war started, were used and the mendacity of political leaders who continued to push those claims. Will the media oblige in the forthcoming scrutiny of the intelligence services? If past experience is anything to go by, they will, with honourable exceptions, and happily so.
References
1. Michael Costa, The Australian – 6/2/2004.
2. House of Representatives Hansard – 16/9/2002
3. John Howard, ABC News – 5/2/2004
4. Editorial, The Australian – 4/2/2004
5. John Howard, National Press Club – 13/3/2003
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Michael Hodson lives in Darwin, Australia.
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