The Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih stated that new exploration showed that
This analysis will cover two essential topics: First, an examination of the contending views on how Iraq’s huge potential oil and gas natural resources can be harnessed for the benefit of the Iraqi people, and second, the actions of the two major Iraqi players, the Iraqi Federal Government and the Federal oil ministry in Baghdad, on the one hand, and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil.
Views on the vital issue of how to use
The first camp believes that
The second camp favors privatizing the existing nationalized oil and gas resources, believing that Iraq cannot go it alone and needs to depend partially, if not completely, on the development of its natural resources by the IOCs. Within this camp are all the political parties within the ‘front of the moderates’ from all the three sectors of Iraqi society who form the Federal government, along with the Federal oil ministry in Baghdad, and the KRG in Erbil.[2]
The Federal government policies
The Federal government and the oil ministry in
Over two and a half years have passed since the first attempt was made back in June 2006 by the federal oil ministry to present the first draft of the oil law; however, mainly due to internal Iraqi dynamics the progress on this law has been brought to a halt. In this analysis, I will not cover the reasons for this standstill, as I have already covered this in some detail[3], and those factors still stand.
These delays necessitated a change in tactics of both the US Administration and the IOCs. These delays also forced the federal government in
The first stage covers the ministry’s short term plans to go ahead with their privatization of the oil and gas resources using all the available old Baathists’ privatization policies and laws.
The Federal oil ministry claims that they obtained the legal authority they need to hold their first bidding round for service contracts to manage several major fields, from the April 1987 Baathist’s Revolutionary Command Council decree that dissolved the state Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) and transferred the authority to sign contracts to the Ministry of Oil (MOO). This solution has provided a way for the Federal oil ministry to carry on their privatization policies until the new law is in force. The Federal government claims that this old decree provides all the authorization that it needs, but it may not be enough to enable it to actually close deals with the IOCs.
Both the Federal oil minister, Dr. Hussain Shahristani, and the Prime Ministerial Oil Advisory Commission (PMOAC) chairman, Thameur Ghadhban, stated on several occasions that "the constitution does not stipulate that oil contracts must be passed by legislation." However, several powerful parliamentarians have disputed this view. Perhaps more importantly, there is a consensus among the IOCs’ oil executives and legal observers that no companies will commit to Iraqi projects while their deal could be superseded by fresh legislation in the form of the new oil and gas law required by the constitution. If the law is not in place, a stop-gap solution by which each contract is approved by parliament (giving the deal the status of legislation) could provide the necessary comfort for IOCs to proceed with investments. Such a compromise would be welcomed by politicians. Parliament Oil and Gas Committee vice chairman Abdelhadi Al-Hassan stated on more than one occasion that currently "every contract has to go through the parliament," but this would be a very long-winded process. So the first stage of the plan is not going to proceed that easily.
The second stage of this two stage strategy will be vital for the medium to long term plans of the Federal government. What they are working on at present is to develop the new oil and gas privatization law, which will be negotiated with the KRG in order to agree on a reconciliation form of law which will be acceptable to both sides and can be presented to the Federal Parliament.
The other tactic the central government in
The key issue which is facing the Federal oil ministry is the reinstatement of the INOC. To this date the federal government has not taken any genuine steps to reinstate INOC before they carry out any negotiations with the IOCs. This is clearly a calculated attempt by the Federal ministry of oil as part of its privatization plans, and will permit the IOCs to push for Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) or similar modules of contracts, since without reinstating INOC first (which is needed to give the oil ministry the backup option of developing future oil production on its own), the negotiating position of the oil ministry will remain extremely weak.[4]
The policies of KRG on Oil & Gas
Since the start of the
The KDP and PUK policies were aimed at assuring that all oil and gas production and developments in the Kurdish areas should be carried out by IOCs through PSCs. They also wanted to ensure that any new INOC authority and ability to control production would be kept to the bare minimum level. The KRG also wanted all strategic decisions and planning to be made at the regional and not at the federal level.
So what are the main issues of disagreement between the Federal Government in
a. The KRG wants to immediately privatize the vast majority of the oil and gas resources in the KRG areas, if not in all of
b. The KRG wants to go all out for the PSC models of agreements which satisfy all the needs of the IOCs, while the Federal oil ministry wants to use other modules of agreements such as the "Exploration Risk Contract" and the "Exploration and Production Contract," which are forms of ‘hybrid’ contracts that satisfy many but not all of the IOCs’ requirements.
c. The KRG wants strategic planning for development to be made at the regional level, while the Federal oil ministry wants it centralized and carried out at the Federal ministry level, but with the participation of the regions and governorates.
d. The KRG has ventured out alone and started signing PSC contracts with several IOCs (up to 28 to this date) without presenting them to the federal oil ministry in
e. The KRG wants to spread their control of the oil and gas fields to areas that are not part of the KRG territory, which they call ‘disputed areas’ in the governorates of Ninewa and Diyala. The Federal government do not to this date accept the KRG’s claims in these areas.
f. The KRG wants to include the governorate of
The new Iraqi Shell gas agreement rip-off
The privatization program of the Federal oil ministry in
The latest ‘Heads of Agreement,’ which was signed on the 22 September 2008, will form a ‘joint venture’ (JV) company between Shell and the Federal Oil Ministry and will give Shell a 25-year monopoly on the whole of the gas industry of southern Iraq. The agreement will also give Shell the largest role in
One of the prominent Iraqi oil and gas experts, Mr. Fouad Al Amir, published in Arabic a comprehensive and detailed analysis of this agreement.[6]
The role of corruption in supporting privatization of Iraqi natural resources
Corruption goes hand in hand with all dictators’ regimes, for instance the old Baathist regime, and also with foreign occupations, including the existing US occupation of Iraq. Corruption has in fact played a vital role in sustaining the
Corruption has also played a fundamental role in sustaining support for US interests within the elected government of the ‘front of the moderates’ in
From the start of the
US federal investigators are now starting an inquiry into the actions of a number of senior
Most Iraqi and international analysts are convinced that the theft or waste of huge sums of US and Iraqi government money could only have happened if senior US officials were themselves involved in the corruption.
As one
US administration pay-offs and corruption have played a major role in the KRG plans, since the powerful leaders of both parties forming the KRG get a percentage with every PSC they sign. The rumors in Kurdistan, which were admitted by some
Corruption within the majority of the Federal government ministries and in particularly, in the Ministry of Oil is widespread.[9] Investigations involving the Ministry of Oil have been manipulated and the Inspector General of the ministry is completely ill-equipped to handle oil theft cases. There is no accurate accounting of oil production, no metering, and no transportation within the ministry, whilst the US occupying administration and organized crime groups are stealing oil for the benefit of militias/insurgents, corrupt public officials, and foreign buyers.[10]
Conclusion
1. The process of privatization of Iraqi oil and gas resources, which was completely nationalized in two stages (1961 and 1972-75), was started by the Baath regime back in April 1987 when the Baathist government took its first steps down the privatization route and dissolved the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). This was followed during the 1990s by the signing of several PSC agreements with IOCs regarding giant Iraqi oil fields. In 1997, the Baathist government signed the first PSC agreement with the Russian oil company Lukoil regarding the giant West Qurna-2 oil field. Then in 2000 they signed a second PSC with the Chinese National oil company on the giant Ahdab oil field, a third with the French Total on super giant Majnoon oil field, and three more privatization agreements with
2. The future of Iraqi oil and gas is bleak. This is due to the fact that the major players — the Federal government/Federal oil ministry in
3. On the other hand there are very important disagreements between the Federal government in
4. The wide spread corruption in the Federal government, the oil ministry and the KRG at all levels, together with the absence of transparency and accountability are playing a crucial role in helping to generate support for the privatization policies within policy making political circles.
5. The privatization policies are not sectarian policies within the Federal oil ministry or the Federal government, as some would have us to believe. It is the policies of all the parties, from all three sectors of Iraqi society in the Iraqi ‘front of the moderates’ who form the Federal government in
Hussein Shahristani, the oil minister, is a Shi’ite, whilst the Prime Ministerial Oil Advisory Commission (PMOAC) chairman, Thameur Ghadhban is a Sunni (he is the second most important individual in the Federal oil ministry and is an old Baathist who was appointed as oil minister by the Governing Council when they appointed Iyad Allawi as prime minister). Ashti Hourani, KRG minister of natural resources is a Kurd and all of them are very much supporters of the privatization of Iraqi oil and gas resources and co-operation with IOCs.
6. When the first versions of the new oil and gas law started to leak out back in 2006 and 2007, the majority of Iraqi oil and gas experts disagreed with the planned privatization, and put forward a united front against these drafts of the law that called for PSC modules with the IOCs. However, when the federal oil minister Hussain Shahristani changed his tactical position from supporting the PSC modules to presenting new privatization modules, such as "Exploration Risk Contracts" and "Exploration and Production Contracts" (EPC), and started openly criticizing the stand of the KRG on several aspects on the oil and gas law by the end of 2007/beginning of 2008 the united front started to weaken. Moreover, some of the Iraqi oil experts started to raise concerns which had a sectarian feel, such as regarding cooperation with
7. One of the main strategic objectives of the war on Iraq was to control Iraqi oil and gas resources.[12] The new US Obama/Biden administration has no policy differences on this issue from the Bush/Cheney’s administration. This was clearly indicated back in November 2006 by the ‘Iraqi study group report’ which presented a joint and long term strategy by both the Democrats and the Republican parties.[13] The words of Mr. Obama in his February 27 speech on the new administration’s policies on Iraq that, ‘The United States pursues no claim on Iraq’s territory or resources,’ should not be taken as authentic by the Iraqi people, as only the actions on the ground in Iraq by the administration and the IOCs will reveal their true intentions.
If the
8. We are no longer fighting the war on the oil and gas front against a bunch of war-mongering religious fanatic neo-conservatives. Today with the new Obama/Biden administration, we are now facing a more sophisticated and intelligent enemy who shares the same objectives with the neo-conservatives but uses different tactics.
9. If the US Administration and the IOCs succeed in their intention to privatize the mainly nationalised Iraqi oil and gas resources, this will only be the initial step before they move on to impose these types of privatization laws on all the other Gulf countries and States which nationalised their oil and gas resources at the same time Iraq did — back in the 1970s — and where over two thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are located.
Notes
1. See Sonia Verma, "Iraq could have largest oil reserves in the world," Times of
2. "Unqualified firms’ invited to 2nd Iraq oil tenders round," Gulf Times, Dec. 28, 2008.
3. Munir Chalabi, "What is holding up the delivery of the long-awaited Iraqi oil law?" ZNet, Aug. 22, 2007; Munir Chalabi, "The internal struggle for the Iraqi oil law continues," ZNet, Jan. 2, 2008.
4. Benjamin Morgan, "Revival of Iraq National Oil Co is key to output boost," AFP, Feb. 3, 2009.
5. Ben Lando, "Shell-Iraq gas company is a monopoly, secret agreement shows," UPI, Nov. 2, 2008.
6. Fouad Al Amir book on the gas agreement with Shell.
7. Patrick Cockburn, "A ‘fraud’ bigger than Madoff," The Independent, Feb. 16, 2009.
8. Michael Rubin, "Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally,"
9. David Corn, "Secret Report: Corruption is "Norm" Within Iraqi Government," Aug. 30, 2007.
10. "Musings On Iraq: Iraqi Corruption," July 4, 2008; Angelique van Engelen, "US Investigation In to Iraqi Government’s Corruption Is ‘Classified Information’: State Department," Global Politician, Nov. 5, 2007.
11. Erica Goode and
12. David King, "Iraq was the first ‘resource war’ of the century," Guardian, Feb. 12, 2009.
13. Munir Chalabi, "The Future of Iraqi oil as proposed by the Iraqi Study Group," ZNet, Jan. 8, 2007.
Munir Chalabi is an Iraqi political and oil analyst living in the
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