In other words, Putin is working on the basis that if he does not eliminate the threat of losing control at home and abroad now, then in two or three years the risks will become unacceptable. Therefore, attempts by NATO members to increase the costs of Russian military action are probably only convincing him that the imminent danger from NATO is too considerable to wait.
Can this situation die down if Putin decides that the costs are too high? On the one hand, there is little to prevent him from saying: ‘Well, they don’t want to accept our conditions, and to hell with them, let’s do something else.’ Conditions for a dignified departure will be provided via negotiations.
On the other hand, Russia’s top-level assessments of future risks as unacceptable probably don’t come from Putin himself, but rather from the country’s military and political leadership. Russia’s current tactics are most certainly the result of extensive collective planning. This means that it will not be possible to simply exit the tailspin that Putin has already climbed into – you will have to somehow explain what has changed and significantly correct the perception of the risks that Russia and its elite are facing.
Thus, if the current tension does not end in a military operation against Ukraine (assuming the conditions put forward by Putin will be ultimately rejected), it will almost certainly result in a serious shake-up in Russia’s elites. And in this scenario, it’s unclear whether Putin himself will hold onto power – though there is little doubt over his tenacity.
What Putin is doing is not only a ‘mad attack’ against Ukraine, but a desperate defence of Russia’s current political structures. This makes the situation much more dangerous. It is easier to persuade someone to rescind an attack than to stop resisting what is perceived as an existential threat. But with the window for drastic action gradually closing, if we can prevent a military operation in the immediate future, there could be significant change in Russia itself.