With Barak No Withdrawal, No Peace

Tanya Reinhart, Syria-Israel

In Israel, there is a feeling of a great historical moment. Finally, after

much pressure and diplomacy – the story goes – Asad agreed to turn to the road

of peace. In the expected peace agreement, Syria will get back all of the Golan

Heights, and Israel will get (among other things) security for the Israeli army

in Southern Lebanon: During the negotiations, Syria will curb the Hizbolla, and

even fight them if necessary, and thus will enable, eventually, an orderly

Israeli withdrawal, within the framework of a comprehensive peace agreement.

(Southern Lebanon has been occupied by Israel since 1978. Hizbolla’s guerrilla

forces, supported by Iran, define their goal as liberating this area, which has

become the Vietnam of Israel, with heavy casualties for the Israeli army, and

massive protest against staying there. The Syrian Golan Heights were conquered

in the 1967 war, and annexed already to Israel.)

Some may lift an eyebrow: Israel is giving up the Golan Heights in exchange

for an orderly withdrawal from Southern Lebanon? But apparently, no one finds

this surprising. Withdrawal from Lebanon was the major promise of Barak’s

elections campaign. By all signs, there is a strong majority in Israel for a

comprehensive agreement of this sort, and the contra-demonstrations represent a

minority. (The polls show that even a quarter of the settlers in the Golan

Height support evacuation for peace.) It is this majority, of people who are

tired of waiting for the next war, or thinking about the missiles that may get

out of control with the 2000 bug, that elected Barak and authorized him to act.

And these people are convinced now that Barak has indeed started to act.

Still, there is something strange in this idyllic picture. Why was it

necessary to exert so much pressure on Assad? He is offered the Golan Height,

along with Southern Lebanon. He is promised a water agreement with Turkey, in

the midst of the worst drought in 45 years. And still he won’t move without

massive pressure. It is not often in history that a state is so resistant to


The answer is that Asad knows that this is nothing but an eyewash. Precisely

the same thing has happened already with Rabin in 1994. ‘Haaretz’ headline of

April 11, 1994 (one of many at the time) declared: "The foreign ministry

prepared a proposal for an agreement with Syria: The working assumption is full

withdrawal from the Golan". Soon we heard that "Syrian and Lebanese

army units raided Hizbolla’s strong-holds and confiscated weapons" (April

19). The negotiations lasted two years, during which the Israeli army had quiet

days in Lebanon. Then, as now, demonstrators marched in Israel against giving up

the Golan Heights, but the negotiations led nowhere. Rabin demanded that the

discussion will focus first on all details of the security arrangements and the

size and time-table of the Israeli withdrawal will be left for the very end.

After two years, the various committees were still discussing the exact location

of some alert station, and managed to produce one unsigned ‘non-paper’ which

mentions nothing about any withdrawal, while Rabin continues to invest

unprecedented sums in construction and development of the Golan.

It appeared that Israel still intended many years of negotiations, which

serve only one purpose – securing the peace of the Israeli army in Lebanon

during these negotiations. In 1996, Asad got fed up and withdrew from the

negotiations. Gradually, the guerrilla war in Southern Lebanon revived, with

severe casualties to the Israeli army.

What Barak offers now is precisely the same course of negotiations. Then why

does Asad agree to return to the role of the Israeli cop in Lebanon? He

surrendered because he was threatened, not only with aggravation of the

economical sanctions against Syria, but also with a Kosovo style war. The plan

(widely referred to in Israeli media) was that Israel would withdraw temporarily

from Lebanon, and then, with the first incident or missile (that could easily be

provoked), the Western world, led by the US, will stand behind the peace-seeking

Israel, when it attacks Syria, and will lend its air-force umbrella to this new

mission of peace. When Barak uses such threats, one should take them seriously.

Already in March 1982, during the preparations to the Lebanon invasion, colonel

Barak suggested in a memorandum to defense minister Sharon, to widen the war

into "a quick operation on Syria -1967 style – that develops through a

quick succession of events" (following "some terrorist activity")

"to a full scale strike on Syria" (1).

Asad won’t sign an agreement without the Golan, and will not even agree to

meet Barak. But he was forced to accept the role of the cop. To help him sell

this to his people, he was allowed to tell them that Israel has agreed to

withdraw. In Israel, they produce for him the spectacle of tears of farewell

from the Golan.

From this game with our nerves, Barak hopes to gain the continuation of

Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. Indeed he declared already that the

military preparations for withdrawal from Lebanon are ‘frozen’ till the end of

the negotiations (that will never end).


The first victims of the new peace era are 24 wounded children of the

Lebanese village Arab a-Salim. They were selected to test Asad’s intentions and

ability to keep the Hizbolla quiet. On Thursday, December 16th, while the

meetings took place in Washington, the collaborating forces of ‘Southern-Lebanon

Army’ shelled their school- yard during the break. The Israeli delegation

"clarified that this was a mistake, and demanded that Damascus will see to

it that the Hizbolla won’t retaliate" (‘Haaretz’);. The test was successful:

"Following pressure from Clinton’s office, Syria sent messages to the

Hizbolla, demanding they do not respond with missiles to the Northern parts of

Israel" (‘Yediot’);.

Despite the misleading name ‘security strip’, Southern Lebanon is one of the

Israeli occupied territories. At the present, there is no need to settle there,

because there are not too many residents left to dislodge. But already in Ben

Gurion’s vision, the Litani river, in this area, is the natural northern border

of Israel (and a source of water). Many attempts were made since the fifties to

get a hold in this area (2), until this was accomplished in 1978. Barak has

gotten to his hands a society fed up with the cost of the Israeli Vietnam, and

an army that cannot handle it. But as long as Asad guarantees quiet, Israel can

stay. If this fails, the Kosovo plan can be retrieved.

Ben Gurion’s vision was bequeathed to the first generation of Israeli

generals, like Sharon and Rabin, who passed it on to the second – Barak and the

others in his government. Those who grew up in the army, and fought for the

pieces of land, won’t give it up for just peace. As long as Barak is in office,

there will be no withdrawal from the Golan Heights, no peace agreement with

Syria, and no renunciation of Southern Lebanon.


(1) The full memorandum was exposed in Haaretz, January 8, 1999

(2) Quotations and further details can be found in Noam Chomsky’s ‘The

Fateful Triangle’, South End Press, Boston, 1983.

A reduced version of this column appeared in the Hebrew ‘Yediot’, December

16, 1999. Tanya Reinhart is a professor of Linguistics and cultural studies, Tel

Aviv University.



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