FOKUPERS,
the Communication Forum for East Timorese Women, was established
in 1997 to promote women’s rights. The founders were widows,
wives of political prisoners, women who were former political prisoners,
and women who had been raped by the Indonesian military. During
the September 1999 post-referendum scorched-earth operation, the
Indonesian military destroyed FOKUPERS’ office and targeted
its members, who went into hiding.
After
regrouping in November 1999, FOKUPERS helped widows in three towns
organize support groups. They lobbied with other women’s organizations
to ensure the new nation’s constitution protected women’s
and children’s rights. FOKUPERS released a detailed report
on violence against women committed in 1999 by the Indonesian military
and their militias. They established the only battered women’s
shelter and began public education campaigns about domestic violence,
an increasing problem in East Timor.
But
FOKUPERS’ main focus is justice, and for justice, the people
of East Timor demand an international tribunal to prosecute war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed since the 1975 Indonesian
invasion.
Most
East Timorese feel neither the trials currently underway in the
capital, Dili, at the hybrid United Nations-East Timorese Serious
Crimes Unit Court, nor the Jakarta trials by the Indonesian ad hoc
Human Rights Court on East Timor are acceptable. Repeated extradition
requests from the Serious Crimes Unit for military officers and
East Timorese militia leaders residing in Indonesia have been denied
by the Indonesian government. The Dili court has therefore been
limited to trying lower-ranking militia members in East Timor.
The
International Crisis Group recently warned the flawed Jakarta proceedings
may “trivialize…the concept of crimes against humanity
in Indonesia.” The court’s mandate is limited to only
two months in 1999 and three of East Timor’s thirteen districts.
Most of the judges have no prior courtroom experience. Only 18 military,
police, militia, and government officials will stand trial; many
are charged with mere crimes of omission. The pre-meditated and
widespread nature of the Indonesian military’s 1999 devastation
of East Timor, documented by United Nations investigators and supported
by Australian intelligence leaks, will not be addressed in Jakarta.
The indictments and courtroom arguments accept and strengthen the
military propaganda that the violence in East Timor was a civil
war between equally matched factions of pro-independence and pro-Indonesia
East Timorese.
Yayasan
HAK, the Foundation for Human Rights, Law and Justice, is the oldest
and largest human rights organization in East Timor. Like FOKUPERS,
HAK has an extensive database of human rights violations committed
throughout the Indonesian occupation. In addition to pushing for
an international tribunal, HAK has organized community reconciliation
meetings where both victims and militia perpetrators of 1999’s
violence talk about their experiences, their pain, and the tough
choices they were forced to make. Both victim and militia participants
say the meetings have aided community and personal healing.
recently, HAK has been working with other East Timorese organizations
for something often overlooked in the standard definition of human
rights: economic justice.
East
Timor ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world. Centuries
of Portuguese colonial neglect and decades of repressive Indonesian
military occupation left East Timor with the highest maternal mortality
rate in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, a per capita income
of $478, and a 60 percent illiteracy rate. Most people farm what
land they have in order to survive, but that by no means guarantees
a sufficient diet. Over half of East Timorese children are underweight,
and one-quarter are malnourished.
The
World Bank has been in East Timor since late 1999. During the October
1999 to May 2002 transitional period when the United Nations was
the governing authority, the World Bank managed grants given East
Timor by donor countries and institutions. Although the World Bank
cannot lend money to non-self governing territories, it shaped important
donor-funded agricultural, health, and educational programs. These
programs received mixed reviews from East Timorese, but a common
critique dismissed the Bank’s community consultations as limited,
rushed, and not meaningful.
Post-independence,
the Bank controls an additional trust fund of donor monies given
the new government. But now it can also make loans to East Timor.
Government leaders have repeatedly and publicly pledged to follow
a “no loans” policy and have drawn up a modest national
budget mindful of their limited resources. For fiscal years 2003
through 2005, the East Timorese government plans on spending just
$256 million. This austerity is especially striking given the extent
of 1999’s devastation; more than 70 percent of buildings were
destroyed nationwide and reconstruction during the transitional
period was agonizingly slow, especially in rural areas. The new
government is stressing social service spending, in response to
widespread demands for tangible improvements in the lives of all
East Timorese. In fiscal year 2002, health and education spending
comprises one-third of all expenditures; this percentage will increase
in subsequent years.
Yet,
serious concerns for East Timor’s financial future and the
role of the World Bank and other international financial institutions
remain. The National Development Plan calls for spending $94 million
over expected income from fiscal years 2003 to 2005. This “external
financing requirement” (in World Bank lingo) has not been met
by East Timor’s donors. The unwillingness of donor countries—many
of which “invested” in East Timor during the occupation
by giving Indonesia military training and weapons—to cover
this shortfall is shameful. The U.S. spends more than East Timor’s
projected three-year budget shortfall on one F-22 fighter plane—and
the Ford through Clinton administrations provided Indonesia with
over $1 billion in weapons during the occupation. East Timorese
activists are wary that, in the absence of additional donor support,
their government will come under increasing pressure to take out
loans.
Since
finances are tight, East Timorese organizations are working with
rural communities on small-scale, local initiatives in agriculture,
health, education, and business. Activists believe communities can
be more self-reliant than the National Development Plan assumes.
They point to the alternative development approach used from 1974
to 1979 by FRETILIN, the former main pro-independence party and
current head of government. Networks of local organizers carried
out literacy campaigns, trainings in traditional herbal medicine,
and organized agricultural co-operatives.
The
Sa’he Institute for Liberation works with some of these same
local organizers today. Sa’he uses popular education to empower
people in often-forgotten rural communities and facilitate knowledge
sharing. Sa’he works with interested communities to identify
which skills are present and which are needed. Different groups
then learn from each other. The goal is not just the transfer of
knowledge, but also nationwide community organizing.
Another
legacy of the Indonesian occupation is the Timor Gap Treaty, which
establishes ownership over the undersea oil and gas reserves between
East Timor and Australia. The 1989 treaty evenly split petroleum
revenues between Australia and Indonesia, even though the fields
lie much closer to East Timor. It was in essence a pay-off; Australia
received more than its fair share in return for formal recognition
of Indonesia’s illegal occupation of East Timor.
Following
the 1999 referendum, Australia renegotiated the Timor Gap Treaty
with UN and East Timorese officials. After much pressure, Australia
agreed to a more fair 10 percent/90 percent division of oil and
gas revenues with East Timor. Although Australia publicly marveled
at its own generosity, this agreement is still problematic. The
10 percent/90 percent scheme applies to an area of the Timor Sea
known as the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA). Fields to
the east and west of the JPDA are the exclusive property of Australia.
However, if the maritime boundary between East Timor and Australia
were determined according to the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, East Timor would receive a larger percentage of the JPDA and
would completely own additional fields on either side of the JPDA,
including the largest field in the Timor Sea. If international standards
were used, East Timor would gain an estimated $28 billion in additional
revenues, compared with the current treaty.
Australia—which
owns four times as much oil and gas in other, uncontested areas
than is in the Timor Sea—isn’t the only greedy party.
The company with the biggest stake in the Timor Sea is U.S.-based
Phillips Petroleum. Phillips was one of the first companies to sign
contracts for Timor Gap oil exploration in 1991, during the Indonesian
occupation. Today, Phillips wants to build a pipeline from its Timor
Sea fields to Australia. In addition to raising environmental concerns,
the pipeline would severely limit employment opportunities for East
Timorese workers in petroleum processing.
With
so many foreign powers active in East Timor—the UN, World Bank,
oil companies, other governments and international aid agencies—it’s
not surprising that one of the most active organizations is La’o
Hamutuk (East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and
Analysis). Since 2000, La’o Hamutuk has investigated and challenged
the major foreign actors in East Timor’s physical, economic,
and social reconstruction. It aims to encourage transparency, democratic
processes, and accountability to the East Timorese. La’o Hamutuk
has also organized international exchanges where Brazilian popular
educators, Nicaraguan domestic violence advocates, and Sri Lankan
and Ecuadorean activists focused on petroleum issues visit East
Timor. One unique feature of La’o Hamutuk is its collaborative
nature; currently, three internationals work alongside five East
Timorese staff.
As
expected, the mainstream media covered East Timor’s independence
with no real context: distant tropical island, brown people, violent
past. Any discussion of issues facing the new country—let alone
the role of western governments in its tragic past— was absent.
Yet in this age of increasing globalization (both from above and
below), the understanding and action of people half a world away
is crucial. Z
Diane
Farsetta is national field organizer for the East Timor Action Network.
For more information, contact the East Timor Action Network at etan@etan.
org, or www.etan.org.