When it comes to two areas of Russia’s immediate neighborhood-Central Asia and South Caucasus-the Russian and American paradox may best be described as follows: both big powers would very much want to include those regions in their respective spheres of influence, yet neither of them wants to go to any extreme in achieving that objective for fear of provoking the other side into misreading or misjudging the other’s real intents that would jeopardize their overall relationship. However, because countries of those two regions have demonstrated a preference for the U.S. military presence and the resultant economic payoffs, Washington is busy enhancing its strategic presence and influence.
The Central Asia and the South Caucasus are part of the former Soviet Union. Today, no Russian leader would even want to contemplate a scenario whereby his country would lose interest in affecting the internal political dynamics of those areas. But this Russian predilection was not adequately or consistently conveyed to the U.S. side. For instance, when the United States was about to invade Afghanistan in October 2001, it wanted military bases in Central Asia that were to be used for military operations in the northeastern part of Afghanistan where the Northern Alliance was fighting a last-ditch battle with the Taliban forces.
Given that the United States was about to carry out a major military operation to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan-an objective that was in complete harmony with Russia’s own regional aspirations-Moscow readily gave a green signal to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to allow basing American and other allied forces. Even though Uzbekistan was in a different category-in the sense that Islam Karimov fancied himself as independent of Russian dominance-still Washington did not prefer to antagonize Moscow by seeking military bases in Uzbekistan without consulting with Russia. The overall understanding was that once military campaign in Afghanistan was over, the United States would pull out of the Central Asian military bases.
However, despite the dismantlement of the Taliban rule, the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan was not finished. But this is a mere technicality for staying in Central Asia, as is now envisioned in Moscow. Fact of the matter is, even if the United States at one time wanted to pull out of Central Asia, it has now concluded to the contrary. In accordance with the grand strategy of fighting global war on terrorism, the Bush administration has adopted a new policy regarding the global basing of its forces, which reflects its overall policy of force projection, transformation, and global rapid reaction. The specifics of this policy accentuates that a number of bases in different parts of the world would be used to deploy rapid response forces in order to deal with regional contingencies of major and minor import. Central Asia and the South Caucasus figure prominently in this force positioning policy. This does not mean that the U.S. permanent military bases of the Cold War years -such as in Germany-will be abandoned altogether. Rather, that their role will be integrated as complementary to the use of new bases.
The foremost political implication of the preceding is that Russia must examine this U.S. grand strategy and calculate on a continuing basis how it affects its own strategic presence and interests in its immediate neighborhood. The Russian leaders know only too well that, given America’s substantial military and economic primacy, countries of Central Asia and South Caucasus readily prefer the presence of American forces within their borders. Russians are painfully aware of the fact that countries of those regions also prefer American force presence because it will not jeopardize their sovereignty, and it will serve as a guarantee against any potential Russian shenanigans aimed at destabilizing them.
It is important to posit that the United States, despite the requirements of its grand strategy, does not wish to antagonize Russia. It needs Russian cooperation on a number of critical issue, such as denuclearization of North Korea, ensuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons, war on terrorism, the future dynamics of missile defense systems, and nuclear arms race, etc. At the same time, Washington would not go to the extent of introducing major changes in its grand strategy in order to accommodate Russian sensibilities and interests. Winning global war on terrorism takes precedence over anything else.
The “unipolar moment,” which emerged as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, has already grown into a unipolar phase, whose longevity promises to last at least the remainder of this decade, virtually guaranteeing the global dominance of the United States in the economic and military arenas. The flip side of that phase is that Russia’s own status as a major power is not likely to experience a dramatic takeoff anytime soon. Consequently, while Washington would be mindful of not antagonizing Russia, it is not about to alter its present policy of maintaining military presence in Central Asia or expanding its presence in countries of the South Caucasus, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan.
The Bush administration is in the process of marking the territory in those areas, a process that will guarantee the emergence of those countries as integral parts of its expanding sphere of influence. Secretary of State Colin Powell, at a meeting of the Organization of Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) on December 2, 2003, has already indirectly warned Russia not to back Georgia’s breakaway regions and exploit instability in that country. He was referring to the two provinces-South Ossetia and Abkhazia-which broke from Georgia more than a decade ago. Moscow has troops in those provinces.
Georgia has gone through a so-called “revolution of roses,” which terminated the rule of President Eduard Shevardnadze on November 30, 2003. This development also ended a government that was ranked by the Transparency International as 124th on its Corruption Perception Index of 133 countries. Now Georgia’s parliament has scheduled an election on January 4, 2004, after its Supreme Court has annulled the November 2 parliamentary elections because of massive voter fraud. Aslan Abashidze, president of Georgia’s autonomous region of Adzharia, and Euard Kokoity, leader of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, have been critical of the toppling of Shevardnadze. South Ossetia and Abkhazia also expressed interest in joining Russia. Even though Adzharia has not yet announced such a preference, it has been hostile to Georgia’s interim rulers. Late November, Russian leaders met with leaders of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adzharia. That event drew an indirect warning from Powell. The U.S. and Georgia’s current leadership suspect that Moscow might be inclined to encourage the breakaway provinces to join the Russian federation.
The Bush administration dispatched Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld to Azerbaijan and Georgia. In Azerbaijan, Washington has long made its presence felt by playing a major role in determining the routing of the Baku-Tiblis-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipelines. As a predominantly Muslim nation, Azerbaijan was one of the first countries to offer Washington support in its global war on terrorism, and has dispatched small contingent of troops to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq. Azerbaijan will also figure prominently in Pentagon’s plans to rely on small skeletal bases.
A number of U.S. national security and treasury officials have already been consulting with the new leadership in Georgia about transition following the upcoming elections. Rumsfeld’s visit was aimed at symbolically ratcheting up the significance of that South Caucasus nation for the U.S. national security. The carrot of eventually joining NATO has been dangled in the faces of Georgia’s young leaders.
The recent Russian response to the growing American presence in its Southern neighborhood has emerged in the recent parliamentary elections in the form mounting assertive nationalism and resentment of Washington. According to one Russian source, parties favoring Western-style democracy and capitalistic economy, and rule of law “failed to garner the sufficient percentage of the voters to secure parliamentary representation.” Vitaly Tretyakov, a veteran Russian political commentator, analyzing the Russian election, wrote that Derzhavnichestvo (i.e., great power ideology) “is absolutely dominant ideology in today’s Russia.”
The big power tussle is continuing, and no conclusive statements may yet be made regarding its future dynamics. The burden of evidence currently indicates that even if President Vladimir Putin wants to remain patient, a noticeable portion is getting restive about what it perceives as the mounting American assertiveness in their country’s traditional backyard. An overarching puzzle is whether the current Russian leadership will be capable of subsiding the mounting hostility in their country toward the United States. What if it is thrown out in the next general elections? To paraphrase an old Chinese curse, the great power tussle in Central Asia and Caucasus seems to heading toward an interesting phase.
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